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FOREWORD 
Although all transport industries have bleen included in the micro-economic reform 
program,  it  is  perhaps the domestic  aviation  industry  which  has  changed the most  quickly 
and  the  most  dramatically. 
The  process of change  started  as  soon as tlie  deregulation  decision  was  taken  in  October 
1987. From then  on  the  major  airlines  began to compete  with  each  other  much  more so 
than  in  the  past.  The  rivalry  in  the  industry  increased as the  formal  start of deregulation 
approached  and  has  intensified  since  then  with  the  entry of Compass  and  the  pressures 
imposed on all  carriers  by  the  economic  downturn. 
The  Bureau  has  taken  this  unique  opportunity to observe an industry  in  transition  and to
analyse the  extent to which  the  policy  objectives  are  being  met. In April 1989 the  Bureau 
held  a  seminar to discuss the  preparations  being  made  for  deregulation. In May 1991, 
the  developments  in the first  six  months of deregulation  were  reviewed at a  Bureau 
conference, ‘A New  Era  in  Australian  Aviation’.  More  recently, a draft of this  paper  was 
discussed at a  workshop  attended  by  representatives  from  the  major  airlines,  academia, 
financial  consultancies  and  portfolio  agencies. 
We are  continuing to monitor  deregulation to gain  further  insights  into  its  effects.  Further 
work  is also underway  to  examine  in  more  detail the  welfare  gainsfrom  deregulation  and 
to look more closely  at  the  impacts  on  remote  areas  and  the  touirsm  and  other  industries 
closely linked to domestic aviation. The results of these analyses will be published 
separately. 
In the  preparation of this  paper,  Bureau  staff  paid a number of visits to the  airlines  and 
other organisations involved in the day it0 day  operations of the industry. Useful 
discussions  were  also  held  with  a  number of government  agencies  and  industry  analysts. 
The  insights  provided  by  the  individuals  concerned ar  gratefully  acknowledged. 
The  study  team  was  led  by  Professor  Curt  Grimm, V siting Fellow  in the Bureau  from the 
School of Business  and  Management  at the IUniversity of Maryland. He  was  ably  assisted 
by  Brad Jennings,  Craig Lawrence  and  Norm  Wuest.  They  were all  able to build on the 
foundations  laid  by  John  Street. 
Hugh  Milloy 
Research  Manager 
Bureau of Transport  and  Communications  Economics 
Canberra 
November 1991 
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ABSTRACT 
The Commonwealth’s regulation of interstate aviation, in place for over thirty 
years, came to an end at midnight on 30 October 1990. This study reviews the 
developments in the last few months of regulation and in the first year of 
deregulation. 
Based on the first year’s evidence, deregulation of domestic aviation in Australia 
has, from the consumers’ perspective, been very successful. Reliance on market 
forces and competition, as opposed to regulation, has so far provided clear 
benefits to consumers in terms of lower fares and improved service quality. 
In particular, discount airfares have been much deeper and more readily available 
under deregulation. Between the September 1990 and June 1991 quarters, real 
average fares over a large sample of the top 20 routes fell by 12 per cent. 
Service quaiity on a number of dimensions has  also improved with deregulation. 
Most notably, an analysis of the servic:es provided by domestic and commuter 
operators on  the top 40 routes indicated that there was a 21 per cent increase  in 
the number of flights between the June quarters of 1990 and 1991. 
The airlines have been able to reduce costs, but their financial performance has 
been adversely affected by the recession and the increased level of competition 
in  the industry. 
The analysis suggests that the expected outcomes from deregulation are being 
realised so far. 
xi 
SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND 
The Commonwealth’s regulation of interstate aviation was in place for over thirty 
years. However, over time the two airlines policy began to be increasingly 
criticised. 
In October 1987 the Government gave notice that it would terminate the Airlines 
Agreement in October 1990 and allow the market to operate within the constraints 
of the established competition policy controls applicable to industry generally. In 
announcing its decision, the Government indicated that its objective was to create 
an environment which would foster: 
. increased responsiveness by airlines to consumer needs; 
a wider range of fares and types of services to provide enhanced travel 
m increased competition and pricing flexibility, leading to greater economic 
opportunities; 
efficiency in the industry; and 
a continuation of Australia’s world-renowned aviation safety record. 
The  two airlines policy came to an end at midnight on 30 October 1990. This 
paper reviews the developments in the last few months of regulation and  in  the 
first year of deregulation. The work follows the industrial organisation paradigm 
that industrial structure influences firm conduct, which in turn shapes market 
performance. 
DEVELOPMENTS  SINCE  DEREGULATION 
Competition within the industry 
An important goal of deregulation was increased competition, which appears to 
have been achieved. Industry concentration has been significantly reduced, due 
largely to the entry of Compass. Only one month after the formal start of 
deregulation Compass Airlines commenced operations, and now provides 
services to Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth and Cairns. 
xiii 
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The emergence of Compass, with a national market share of more than 10 per 
cent in its  first year of operation, illustrates that although some barriers to entry 
may  be present  in the industry, such barriers are not impregnable. For  example, 
the  terminal  facilities available to new entrants, although limited, have allowed 
Compass to enter the market and there  is further room for another entrant onto 
the  busiest  trunk routes. The availability of terminal access has greatly facilitated 
the establishment of structural conditions to achieve adequate competition  under 
deregulation. 
A regression analysis of discount fares across the  top 100 markets confirms  that 
the presence of Compass in a particular market has been a significant  stimulus 
to competition. In addition, the analysis reveals that the two incumbents are now 
competing with each other to a great degree, much more so now  than  under 
regulation. 
Changes to fares 
In the months before deregulation  the incumbent airlines adopted a much more 
flexible and  innovative approach to the introduction of discount fares. This  trend 
has intensified in the more competitive environment since deregulation. In 
particular,  discounts have become deeper,  given that highly restricted 45 percent 
discounts on full economy fares were generally the best  available  in  the years 
before deregulation, while less restricted  discounts  of 60 to 70 percent have been 
available  during 1991. 
The principal source of data on the  use of discount fares is the Prices  Surveillance 
Authority (PSA), which was directed by the Government in February 1991 to 
monitor movements in average fares on interstate routes. The PSA has so far 
collected quarterly data on average fares and passenger numbers from the 
airlines for each of the  top 20 routes and has aggregated these to provide  industry 
average fare indices. The  analysis was then  focused on the seventeen top 20 
routes which are either interstate or have a minimum of  three operators. 
The PSA has reported that, on these seventeen routes, aggregate average 
revenue has fallen by  9.9 per cent  in  nominal terms between the  September  1990 
and  June 1991 quarters. Adjusted for inflation this means that the  average  fare 
on these  routes fell by 12.2 per cent in  real terms. 
Moreover, since over 80 per  cent of passengers fly on the  top 20 routes, there 
has clearly been a significant reduction of fares system-wide. Even  under  the 
very conservative assumption that average fares did not change  on  the other 
routes, the  fall  in  the  real average fare across the entire domestic aviation  network 
was about 10 percent by the end of June 1991. Since then, it  is likely that average 
fares have fallen even further  as the airlines have been engaged in the most 
intense fare war to  date. 
The benefits of lower fares appear to have been slightly greater on routes with 
high traffic  densities and more operators. For example, the maximum discounts 
on the  routes directly linking Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and  Perth  averaged 
xiv 
Summary 
63 per cent off the incumbents' standard economy fares, while on a sample of 21 
other routes in  the  top 40, the maximum discount was 58 per cent less than the 
standard economy fare on average. 
Changes  to  service quality 
Overall, service quality on a number of dimensions has improved since 
deregulation. Among the indicators of 'service quality assessed in  the report are 
the following: 
Flight frequency. An analysis of the services provided by domestic and 
commuter operators on the top 40 routes indicated that there was a 21 per  cent 
increase in the number of flights between the June quarters of 1990 and 1991. 
As in  the case of fare decreases, the benefits were distributed widely across 
routes and not restricted to the routes on which Compass operates. The largest 
increases have occurred on the BrisbaneGairns and Brisbane-Mackay routes, 
with increases of 1 15 and 107 per cent respectively. 
Non-stop services. One of the main disadvantages to consumers from 
deregulation in  the United States was a decrease in nonstop services between 
many locations due largely to the establishment of hub-and-spoke networks. So 
far there has been no evidence of hub-and-spoke networks forming in Australia, 
and in fact there is some evidence thlat there has been a slight increase in 
non-stop services since deregulation. The passengers who are able to take 
advantage of this trend benefit from shorter transit times and  avoid  the 
inconvenience of changing aircraft. 
On-time performance. Over the past year there have been improvements in 
on-time performance for aircraft arrivals and departures at the main capital city 
airports. This is in contrast to the situatiom in  the United States after deregulation 
where flight delays occurred at  many airports because infrastructure capacity did 
not keep pace with the increase in demand. 
In-cabin and on-ground  services. Improvements to in-cabin services have also 
been significant. Compass and Eastwest, with their one class cabins, have 
chosen to provide generous space for passengers, while Australian and Ansett 
now provide more space and upgraded service in the battle for market share for 
premium class passengers. 
On the ground, business passengers ,have benefited from improvements to 
lounges and a range of services such as; valet parking. 
Network capacity and patronage 
The overall capacity offered on domestic airline routes has increased 
substantially since deregulation. In the year ended September 1991, which 
included e!even full months of deregulation, industry capacity was 22.1 billion 
available seat kilometres, which was 23 per cent greater than the previous record 
achieved in the year ended September 1988 and 43 per cent greater than for the 
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year  ended September 1990. The large increase in capacity between the  year 
ended September 1990  and  the year ended September 1991  may be  explained 
in part  as recovery from the airline pilots’ dispute. However, given  that  capacity 
this year has exceeded the previous all time high of 1988, which was  achieved 
under more favourable economic circumstances, a significant component of 
industry growth should be  attributed to stimulation of  the market by  incentives 
made possible under deregulation. 
Patronage has also climbed to record levels since deregulation, despite the 
economic recession. The domesticairlines performed a  record  total of  16.1 billion 
revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) for the year to September 1991 and  the 
RPK figure for the September 1991 quarter was 45 per cent higher than  the 
corresponding figure for last year. 
Although data on patronage of competing modes is limited, it  is  clear  that low 
discount fares have drawn significant numbers of passengers from  intercity  rail 
and bus operators. 
OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR 
Based on the first year’s evidence, deregulation of domestic aviation in  Australia 
has, from the consumers’ perspective, been very successful. Reliance on market 
forces and competition, as opposed to regulation, has so far provided clear 
benefits to consumers. 
The  benefits from deregulation have extended to a  broad range of markets. In 
particular,  reduced fares and  improved service frequency have extended  well 
beyond  the Adelaide-Melbourne-Sydney-Brisbane corridor. Destinations  such 
as  Perth  and Cairns have been among the greatest beneficiaries;  indeed,  the 
Northern Queensland tourism industry has enjoyed a dramatic turnaround, 
largely as  a result of discount fares. While consumer benefits from discounted 
fares  and  improved frequencies have often been greatest in the markets where 
Compass has entered, significant benefits have extended to a  broad  range of 
markets. For example, travellers  in  cities such as Darwin and Hobart have also 
been clear beneficiaries from deregulation. 
Although it  is not yet possible  to quantify the change in consumer surplus  from 
deregulation, it is clear that consumer surplus has increased. Studies of the 
impact of deregulation on consumer surplus in  other countries have shown  that 
consumer surplus depends primarily on the level of fares, the average time 
between flights (flight  frequency),  and the average duration of flights. Australia’s 
domestic deregulation has clearly produced lower fares and shorter average 
times between flights. Given that on balance there appear to be more non-stop 
services in  the wake of deregulation, the average duration of flights has arguably 
declined slightly as well. Thus, consumer surplus has unambiguously improved. 
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Summary 
There have been bright spots as well from the carriers’ perspective. There is 
clearly improved production efficiency in the industry with, on average, lower cost 
of providing service. This is partly due to Compass’s low cost entry and partly 
due to the efforts by the incumbent domestic airlines to cut costs. 
On the other side, the airlines have experienced the effects of a large increase 
in overall capacity and greater price colmpetition during a recession. As a result 
the profitability of the airlines has been1 adversely affected. However, data are 
unavailable for detailed study of airline financial performance. 
Although a quantification of economic effects of domestic deregulation involving 
counterfactual estimates of both consumer and producer surplus has yet to be 
tackled, the evidence strongly su’ggests that economic welfare has 
unambiguously improved so far. The evidence is convincing that deregulation 
has brought about lower prices and reduced costs. 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
What does the future hold for the Australian domestic aviation industry? It is 
predicted that the benefits enjoyed by consumers in the first yearwill  be sustained 
over time, although perhaps not to the same level. This prediction is  in contrast 
to a number of recent media reports which have argued that fare discounting has 
caused  the airlines to lose money. Thus, the argument goes, it is inevitable that 
discounting and fares return to pre-deregulation levels. This is a specious 
argument as it neglects two important flactors, namely the recessionary impact 
on business travel and the potential for airlines to further rationalise costs. 
It is quite clear that  the recession has had a dramatic impact on business travel. 
This loss of high yield patronage has had serious adverse financial consequences 
for the airlines. Both the recession and the fare discounting under deregulation 
have contributed to the weak financial pesformance of the airlines in  the past year. 
As discussed above, airlines have lproceeded with a modicum of cost 
rationalisation. However, the analysis inldicates that there is considerable scope 
for further cost rationalisation in Australian domestic aviation. Continued 
competition under deregulation, in co’njunction with disappointing financial 
performance, will be an incentive for airlines to proceed with efforts to cut costs. 
Thus, the most likely scenario is that as the economy improves and airlines 
continue with their efforts to cut costs, industry profits will improve while fare 
discounting will persist. 
Beyond this general prediction, our analysis suggests that the future direction of 
competition and market performance will be strongly influenced by future industry 
structure. Given the existence of a competitive environment, it appears likely that 
discounting will continue for the foreseeable future. Although the intensity of 
competition may moderate somewhat with an upturn of the economy and market 
growth to reduce excess capacity, it is anticipated that fare discounting and levels 
xvii 
BTCE Report 73 
will resemble more closely the experience in the first year  of deregulation than 
the pre-deregulation experience. Indeed, competition could  be enhanced by the 
introduction of services by more new entrants. 
The competitive environment which has existed since deregulation has resulted 
in significant changes to the structure of the industry. A new entrant has shown 
that, although some barriers to entry exist, these can be overcome. Moreover, 
the presence of  a  new operator, with adifferent cost structure, operating practices 
and marketing techniques, has greatly increased the rivalry between all domestic 
carriers. 
It is likely that these structural and behavioural changes are here to stay. In the 
coming years the ownership of the airlines may change, and the aircraft may have 
to be repainted in different colours, but the industry is now operating in a 
fundamentally different way. So far it appears that the Government’s 
deregulation objectives are being met. 
xviii 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
At midnight on 30 October 1990 the ‘two airlines policy’ came to an end. For the 
first time in 38 years, Australia’s interstate air services were open to free 
competition. This paper reviews the developments in the last few months of 
regulation and in the first year of deregulation. It focuses on the impact of 
deregulation, both on the airline industry and on the travelling public. More 
generally, it addresses the question: hlave the objectives of deregulation been 
met so far? 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Chapter 2 provides an historical overview 
of the two airlines policy and the statistical trends during the last years of 
regulation. Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical basis for the  work, drawing from 
the industrial organisation paradigm that industrial structure influences firm 
conduct, which in turn shapes market performance. Chapter 3 also details the 
salient structural features of the airline lmarket and describes how the structure 
has changed since deregulation. Chaptier 4 examines firm pricing conduct under 
deregulation and includes both longitudinal and cross-sectional assessments of 
pricing behaviour. A primary finding oif the chapter is that changes in market 
structure predict quite accurately thle pricing behaviour of firms under 
deregulation. 
Chapters 5 and 6 examine market performance from the consumer perspective, 
focusing on  fares and service quality respectively. Chapter 7 examines the effect 
of deregulation on other modes of transport. Chapter 8 draws conclusions and 
looks to the future. 
1 
CHAPTER 2 AUSTRALIA’S  TWO  AIRLINES  POLICY 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW’ 
In the early 1950s the two main airlines in Australia were the government-owned 
Trans-Australia Airlines (TAA) and the privately owned Australian National 
Airways (ANA). However, the future of  ANA looked bleak in the face of strong 
government support for TAA. In an attempt to ensure ANA’s ongoing financial 
viability, and so to guarantee competitive services on the major domestic routes, 
the Menzies Government developed the 1952 Civil Aviation Agreement between 
the Commonwealth and ANA. This agreement did not exclude other carriers from 
operating interstate trunk route services or from importing new aircraft, nor did it 
attempt to restrict route access. 
Despite the assistance to ANA under the 1952 agreement, the airline’s financial 
position continued to deteriorate and it’ was taken over by Ansett Transport 
Industries (ATI) in 1957. 
This led to  the development of the  1957 Civil Aviation Agreement, which allowed 
only TAA and Ansett Airways, as parties to the agreement, to operate trunk route 
services. Under this version of the two airlines policy, the industry stabilised and 
developed in the 1960s and early 1970s. ‘This stability, combined with the viability 
of the main operators, helped to justify the extensive public investment in 
infrastructure required to introduce sophilsticated  jet aircraft. 
However, domestic aviation policy began to be increasingly criticised on the 
grounds that effective competition had not been achieved and both airlines were 
operating the same equipment on the same routes with the same schedules for 
the same fares. In response to these criticisms some changes were made to the 
agreement in 1972. 
1. Much of the  material in this  historical  overview  is  based on the  paper  ‘Competition  policy in 
domestic  aviation -or the  rise  and  fall of the! two airlines pol~cy’, prepared by D. Campbell 
of the Department of Transport  and  Communications. 
3 
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The policy debate, partly stimulated by dramatic decreases in price and increases 
in availability of international air travel, continued through the 1970s. The  end 
result was the introduction in 1981 of a package of legislation which remained 
largely unchanged until its repeal with deregulation in October 1990. The 1981 
Airlines Agreement was designed to increase the level of competition within the 
industry, but it maintained the basic thrust of the two airlines policy as it applied 
to the trunk route network. 
The fundamental question of the Commonwealth's role in the economic regulation 
of interstate aviation was addressed by the Independent Review of Economic 
Regulation of Domestic Aviation (May Review), commissioned by the Hawke 
Government in 1985. 
The May Review, which took place over about two years, was critical of the 
existing arrangements and drew attention to significant public dissatisfaction with 
the current policy, including the widespread view that it worked to  the 
disadvantage of consumers and encouraged the airlines to serve the high yield 
(business) market to the detriment of the leisure market. It found that, in 
comparison with its overseas counterparts, Australian aviation was characterised 
by relatively low labour productivity and relatively high and stable profit levels. 
In October 1987 the Government gave notice that it would terminate the Airlines 
Agreement'in October 1990 and allow the market to operate within the constraints 
of the established competition policy controls applicable to industry generally 
(Evans 1987). In announcing its decision, the Government indicated that its 
objective was to create an environment which would foster: 
. a wider range of fares and types of services to provide enhanced travel 
. increased competition and pricing flexibility, leading to greater economic 
. a continuation of Australia's world-renowned aviation safety record. 
increased responsiveness by airlines to consumer needs; 
opportunities; 
efficiency in the industry; and 
In practice, the deregulation decision meant that from 31 October 1990 the 
Government withdrew from economic regulation of the following four matters. 
Firstly, controls over the importation of aircraft were removed. These controls 
provided the basis for the legislative and contractual arrangements which 
regulated the industry. 
Secondly, the detailed determination of the passenger capacity that could be 
provided by each trunk airline ceased. Under the  two airlines policy, Ansett and 
Australian had equal capacity over competitive routes.2 
2. In 1986 the  Australian  National  Airlines  Corporation  changed its trading  name  from 
Trans-Australia  Airlines to Australian  Airlines. 
4 
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Thirdly, the Independent Air Fares Committee (IAFC), which set all fares for 
scheduled passenger services, was abolished and the Commonwealth withdrew 
from the determination of air fares. During the nine years in which the IAFC set 
fares, the revenue per passenger kilometre, averaged over Ansett, Australian and 
Eastwest services, decreased slightly im real terms. 
Fourthly, the constraints on the entry o'f  new domestic operators to trunk routes 
were removed. 
In strict terms, the two airlines policy did not apply to interstate routes, but rather 
to the provision of scheduled passenger 'services over trunk routes (which 
included both interstate and intrastate routes). Under the Airlines AgreementAct 
7987, a trunk route was defined as any route linking the following 18 trunk route 
centres: Adelaide, Alice Springs, Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra, Coolangatta, 
Darwin, Gove, Hobart, Launceston, IMackay, Melbourne, Mount Isa, Perth, 
Proserpine, Rockhampton, Sydney ancl Townsville. 
Much of the analysis in the following (chapters focuses on the changes since 
deregulation on the trunk route network. However, some of the impact of 
deregulation has been, and will continue to be felt, on non-trunk routes serviced 
by the main domestic airlines and the commuter airlines affiliated with them. 
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 
The airlines which supply scheduled passenger services within Australia are 
usually categorised in terms of  domestiic or commuter operators. By definition, 
a domestic carrier operates scheduled regular public transport (RPT) services 
with aircraft with 38 seats or more or  with a payload of more than 4200 kilograms; 
a commutercarrier operates scheduled RPT services with aircraft less than  38 
seats (DoTC 1991a). At present the domestic carriers are Ansett Australia, 
Ansett Express, Ansett WA, Australian Airlines, Australian Airlink, Compass 
Airlines, Eastern Australia Airlines and Eastwest. 
The growth in the supply, in terms of available seat kilometres (APK), and use, 
in terms of revenue passenger kilometres (RPK), of the services rovided by the 
domestic airlines over the past 15 years are shown in figure 2.1. t: 
The main features of the time series daita in figure 2.1 are: 
- the decrease in activity during the economic downturn of 1982-83; 
- the period of strong growth starting in 1983 and culminating in  the 
Bicentennial and Expo activities of .I 988; 
3. For  some  applications  the  statistics in figure 2.1 may  need to be  treated  with  caution  as  since 
1977 there  has  been a decline from about 130 to 45 in  the  number of airports  serviced by 
domestic  carriers  (Henchy & Smith 1991). I,n almost  all  cases  commuter  airlines  now  provide 
scheduled RPT services to the airports  affected  by  these  operational  changes. 
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Figure 2.1 Aggregate available seat kilometres and revenue passenger 
kilometres for Australian domestic aviation, 1976 to 1991 
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Figure 2.2 Australian air and rail passengers, 1976 to 1991 
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the  effect of the pilots’ dispute in 1989-90;  and 
the  record  levels of activity  since  deregulation of interstate  aviation from 31 
October 1990. 
It follows from the  data in figure 2.1 that  the  average  load  factor for domestic 
airlines in the  period  1976 to 1989  was, with few exceptions, in the  range  67 to 
77  per cent. 
Figure 2.2 shows the  variation  over  time of the  number of passengers carried by 
the  domestic  airlines  (measured in terrrls of revenue passengers uplifted on each 
flight). In the period from 1976 until the pilots’ dispute in 1989-90, patronage 
grew  on  average by 2.5 per  cent  per year. 
To put the  task  performed by the  domestic  carriers into a broader  perspective, 
the  patronage  levels for intersystem  rail transport and  international  air  travel to 
and from Australia  have  also  been  included in figure 2.2. In 1987, for example, 
domestic  airline  patronage  was  about  eight  and four times  greater  than 
international  air  and long distance rail  patronage  respectively. In the  same  year 
patronage on the  domestic  airlines  was  about  eleven  times  greater  than 
patronage on commuter  airlines.  Data Ion long distance  coach  and  car  travel  are 
not available for comparison. 
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CHAPTER 3 IMPACT OF DEREGULATION  ON  INDUSTRY 
STRUCTURE 
One of the Government’s main objectives in deregulating domestic aviation was 
to foster greater competition in the industry (Evans 1987). The standard 
paradigm in industrial organisation economics posits that the degree of rivalry 
among firms in an industry is largely a function of market structure. That is, 
structural features such as the number of sellers and buyers, barriers to entry and 
the cost structures of firms will strongly influence the intensity of rivalry among 
firms. It follows that in understanding airline behaviour since deregulation and in 
predicting the future competitiveness of the market, careful attention should  be 
paid to structural conditions, in particular, to changes in structure which have 
occurred since deregulation, 
This chapter begins with an examination of the theory regarding structural 
determinants of rivalry. This is followed by an examination of salient structural 
features in the post-deregulation domestic airline market. Changes in 
concentration and factors influencing rivalry are also examined, and  the chapter 
concludes with an assessment of entry barriers in the domestic airline industry 
- a critical factor in determining industry structure now and in the future. 
STRUCTURAL  DETERMINANTS OF RIVALRY 
The industrial organisation economics literature has focused on a number of key 
structural determinants of the degree of competition (Scherer & Ross 1990). 
These include the number of competitors, degree of new entry, strength of 
industry demand/degree of excess capacity, and homogeneity of firms in costs 
and size. Each will be discussed in turn. 
Number of competitors 
As more firms compete in a market, the degree of rivalry will become more 
intense. With more firms, the chances acre greater that any  one maverick firm will 
set off a fierce competitive skirmish. Also, with additional firms, coordination of 
market response becomes more difficult. 
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Existence of new  entrants 
New entrants typically inject a great deal of rivalry into an industry. Such firms 
may come  in with low prices in an effort to attract customers from existing firms. 
Also, a new firm may not be familiar with the established signalling and other 
communication mechanisms which may reduce the level of competition. Also, 
new entrants frequently increase the degree of industry capacity and 
heterogeneity, which, as discussed below, also tends to accelerate the intensity 
of competition. On the other hand, strong entry barriers increase industry stability 
and  can result in lower rivalry, in that firms can more easily engage in long-term 
mutually beneficial actions if they are confident the same set of players will be in 
the industry over time. 
Strength of industry  demandldegree of excess  capacity 
A growing industry demand will facilitate a ‘live and let live’ attitude on  the part of 
firms. In general, a growing market can encourage stability, as each firm can 
grow in size without rocking the boat. On the other hand,  a decrease in  demand 
or even afall  in the growth rate, perhaps brought about by an  economicdownturn, 
can lead to competitive warfare. 
Related to industry demand  is the degree of capacity utilisation in  the industry. 
Firms producing at close to full capacity have little incentive to try to increase 
output by lowering prices. On the other hand, if firms are faced with excess 
capacity and idle resources, the temptation is great to lower prices and increase 
output in  an effort to fill excess capacity. As such, a fall in industry demand, where 
capacity cannot be reduced easily, can have a particularly strong effect on 
increasing rivalry. Also, a  new entrant, where existing competitors cannot readily 
reduce capacity, will even in  the face of strong economicconditions lead to excess 
capacity at least in the short term. 
Homogeneity of costs and  size 
Firms with similar cost structures will find it easier to tacitly agree on the same 
price structures to maximise joint industry profits. Widely varying costs among 
firms will generally result in stronger rivalry. Also, if firms are similar in other 
dimensions such  as size, corporate culture and length of time in the industry, 
coordination will be easier and rivalry will be less intense. 
CHANGES IN INDUSTRY  STRUCTURE  SINCE  DEREGULATION 
The above theory suggests that changes in the degree of competition would be 
sharply influenced by changes in industry concentration, existence of new 
competitors, degree of excess capacity and heterogeneity of competitors. This 
section will examine the changes in these structural features. 
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Compass’s entry 
Competition from new entrants has been one of the important policy objectives 
of deregulation of domestic aviation. The role  that Compass Airlines has played 
since deregulation has been critical in stimulating passenger demand and 
fostering substantial discounting of fares. 
Compass commenced operations on 1 December 1990 with two Airbus 
A300-600R aircraft. The expected heterogeneity of service is exemplified by 
Compass’s plan to offer a one-class service with two key features not currently 
offered by Ansett or Australian, more leg-room and in-flight video entertainment. 
At the same time Compass cut in-flight service costs. 
In  the initial start-up phase Compass encountered several difficulties. For 
example, delays were caused by a lack of refuelling facilities at Sydney airport, 
and the reservations system caused some problems. The arrival of the third 
Airbus was delayed from February to 1 April 1991. Additional capacity was put 
in place in  mid July with the arrival of an A31 0 aircraft and on 26 August with the 
arrival of Compass’s fourth A300-600H aircraft. 
As  at 1 October 1991 Compass operated with five aircraft into Adelaide, Brisbane, 
Cairns, Melbourne, Sydney and Perth. Brian Grey has indicated that Compass’s 
choice of a wide-bodied aircraft was ldictated by gate limitations at the  major 
airports (BTCE 1991). 
As illustrated by figures 3.1 and 3.2,  one of the features of the Australian domestic 
aviation industry is that a new competitor can gain access to a large number of 
passengers by flying on only a small number of key routes. This has been the 
strategy pursued by Compass. Its route structure, shown in figure 3.3, reveals 
how it is using Melbourne airport as  its major operations centre. The eight routes 
on which Compass offers most of its services are Melbourne-Sydney, 
Melbourne-Perth, Brisbane-Sydney, Perth-Sydney, Brisbane-Melbourne, 
Adelaide-Melbourne,  Cairns-Melbourne,  Adelaide-Sydney. These routes 
accounted for about 75 per cent of all Compass services on 1 September 1991. 
Melbourne has less congestion than Sydney airport and Compass stages all its 
aircraft through this centre. In addition, by running a common fleet from this 
airport it reduces dead-heading of crews and minimises overnight stays by crews 
at other destinations. Long-haul services, such as Melbourne-Perth and 
Perth-Sydney, enable Compass to tatke advantage of lower costs per seat 
kilometre. 
Compass’s  cost  advantage 
An important issue regarding the present and future strength of Compass is  its 
operating costs in comparison to the incumbent airlines. Direct operating costs 
of Compass and the incumbent airlines were estimated using the BTCE’s 
Aerocost software. For Compass, an ,Airbus 300-600R was simulated, with a 
utilisation of 3200 hours per annum and a 1250 kilometre average stage distance. 
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of passengers by ranked city pairs in 1990 
A range of aircraft, including B727s, B737s, B767s, A300s and A320s were 
simulated to represent the incumbent airlines. Utilisation was assumed to be 
3300 hours per annum with a 1000 kilometre stage distance. The average cost 
components  for the incumbent airlines were estimated by weighting the  individual 
aircraft cost components by the total hours used for each aircraft type in 1990. 
It is  estimated that Compass’s direct operating costs per available seat kilometre 
are 5.3 cents  compared to  8.5 cents for the incumbent airlines (see table  3.1). 
The difference  can be accounted for mainly  by the increased  utilisation of the 
Compass aircraft, the longer average stage distance and the economies of 
operating larger aircraft. When the Compass operation was simulated with a 
utilisation of 3300 hours, costs  per seat kilometre rose to 5.7 cents. Using  an 
average stage distance of 1000 kilometres,  costs  increased further to 6.1 cents 
per seat kilometre. It follows that, of Compass’s original 3.3 cents cost differential, 
12 per cent  is due to greater aircraft utilisation, and another 14 per  cent  due  to 
the  longer average stage distance. However, the main advantage is inherent in 
the larger  aircraft that Compass uses. 
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TABLE 3.1 ESTIMATES OF DIRECT  OPERATING  COSTS FOR COMPASS  AND THE MAIN 
INCUMBENTAIRLINES 
(cents per availa,ble seat kilometre) 
Compass 
Base Utilisation Stage lncumbenf 
Capital 
Fuel 
Maintenance 
Crew 
Government 
Other 
Total 
1.36  1.74 1.81  1.56 
0.70 10.70 0.73 0.88 
0.89 0.89 0.93 1.64 
0.32  0.34 0.35 0.74 
1.44  1.44 1.60  1.90 
0.56 0.56 0.70 l .55 
5.26 5.65  6.1  1 8.52 
Source BTCE  estimates. 
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Figure 3.3 Compass routes as at 1 September 1991 
In terms of the direct operating cost components, Compass’s aircraft have higher 
capital costs per seat kilometre than the incumbent airlines (because they are 
newer), but are much more fuel efficient and less costly to maintain. The 
difference in crew costs is partly due to  the continued presence of three member 
cockpit crews in some aircraft and the higher number of flight attendants per seat 
in  the aircraft flown by the incumbents. Compass’s costs per seat kilometre for 
the ‘other’ component of the direct operating costs (which includes provisioning 
and  ground services), are estimated to  be less than half the incumbents’ costs. 
The Bureau estimates that Compass’s overheads are 2.7 cents per ASK 
compared to 5 cents for the incumbents. That is, Compass not only holds an 
advantage over the incumbents in direct operating costs, but also has much 
leaner overheads. This results in total costs per ASK of about 8 cents for 
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Compass ::..:::c ~4 cents for the incumbents. Compass Airlines’ Chief Executive 
Officer, BT)..L-;~! ,3rey, claims that Compass’s total costs per ASK are 7.5 cents, 
compared to about 14 cents for the inwmbent airlines. 
Although the cost analysis in table 3.1 provides some insights into Compass’s 
competitiveness, it only tells parts of the story. Unlike the situation in the United 
States, revenue data for individual airlines are not publicly available in Australia. 
The only publicly available revenue data are the industry-average fare indices 
published  by the Prices  Surveillance  Authority.  These  are  discussed  in  chapter 5.
Changes in market  concentration 
The entry of Compass has reduced the level of industry concentration which 
existed under regulation. Since enterinig the market, Compass has gained 10 per 
cent of the total aviation market and, bly 1 September 1991, had captured 21.3 
per  cent of the markets in which it was then operating. More detailed information 
on Compass’s share of the airline market over time and how its growth has 
affected other airlines’ market shares is provided in figures 3.4 and 3.5. Roy 
Morgan research statistics report that Compass had attracted 8.9 per cent of all 
business travellers by October (Blackburn 1991). 
Further insight into the structural changes brought about by deregulation can be 
obtained by examining the number of  rcompetitors on each of the main routes. 
Figure 3.6 shows the  top 20 routes for 1988, and figure 3.7 shows the top 20 
routes so far in 1991. Two routes, Devonport-Melbourne and Karratha-Perth, 
were replaced in the top 20 by Cairns-Sydney and Adelaide-Alice Springs, 
between 1988 and 1991. 
It can be seen from acomparison of figures 3.6 and 3.7 that additional competition 
has been generated on the following ten routes: Melbourne-Sydney, 
Bnsbane-Sydney,  Adelaide-Melbourne,  Brisbane-Melbourne,  Adelaide-Sydney, 
Melbourne-Perth, Canberra-Melbourne, Brisbane-Cairns, Adelaide-Perth, 
and Cairns-Sydney. Eastwest withdrew from the Perth-Sydney route, but the 
number of competitors was maintained by the entry of Compass. 
Potential  new  entrants 
Other potential entrants at this stage ,are AAA Airlines, Air Hibiscus, Capitol 
Airlines of Australia, Seaboard Airlines, Southern Cross Airlines and 
Transcontinental Airlines of Australia. Reports in the media suggest that 
Transcontinental and AAA  are the two airlines which are the most likely to enter 
the market, along with a new small regional operator, Northern Australian Airlines, 
which is expected to challenge Ansett WA with four Fokker 100s. 
Transcontinental Airlines proposes to prlwide a business-oriented service with a 
fleet of six B737-500 aircraft. This aincrafi, which normally seats 122, will be 
configured to seat 90 for Transcontinental. The airline intends to offer a three 
class first/business/economy configuration with business class fares for first 
class, full economy for business class and a discount rate for economy 
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Figure 3.4 Airline market shares - revenue passenger kilometres, 
September quarters 1988 to 1991 
Australian 43% Australian group 40% 
Compass 0% 
Eastwest 6% 
Ansett  arour, 4 
Ansett  group  51% 
- .  
September  quarter  1988  September  quarter  1991 
Source DoTC ( 199 1 c). 
Figure 3.5 Airllne market shares - passengers, September quarters 
1988 to 1991 
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passengers. The airline intends to initially increase competition on Western 
Australian and Tasmanian routes. Australian  Aviation (July 1991) reported that 
Transcontinental proposed to commelnce operations in Western Australia by 
March 1992, with east coast services in place by late 1992. 
AAA Airlines plans to initially operate a Fleet  of three MacDonell Douglas DC9-30 
aircraft on 120 services during the week between Sydney and Melbourne. On 
weekends and public holidays two of the aircraft will be chartered out. AAA 
Airlines intends to put 12 600 economy seats into the Melbourne-Sydney market 
each week, an increase of approximately 14 per cent on the capacity on that 
route, based on October 1991 passenger data. The airline expects to raise 70 
per cent of its capital from pilots and 30 per cent from a group of Sydney investors. 
AAA Airlines plans to take delivery of its first aircraft in early 1992. 
Alice Springs o 
- 4 airlines 
3 airlines -Hobart 
2 airlines 
Note Ansett, Ansett WA and Ansett NSW are treated as one operator. 
Source DoTC (1 991 a). 
Figure 3.6 Number of domestic airlines on each of the top 20 routes in 1988 
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4 airlines 
2 airlines 
Note Ansett, Ansett WA and Ansett Express are treated as one operator. 
Source DoTC (1 991  a). 
Figure 3.7 Number of domestic airlines on each of the top 20 routes in 1991 
BARRIERS  TO  ENTRY 
A key to  the future structure, conduct and performance of the domestic airline 
market is  the prosperity of new entrants. That is, a critical structural feature of a 
market is the height of industry entry and operational barriers, which will 
determine whether existing and potential new entrants can survive and thrive. 
The United States experience is discomfiting on this issue, as virtually all new 
United States airline entrants have fallen by the wayside. Although the economic 
literature prior to deregulation in  the United States generally asserted that there 
were no significant entry barriers or disadvantages for small airlines, experience 
and subsequent research has shown otherwise. 
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The sources and importance of entry barriers in the Australian settin are now 
examined, with reference to  the United States situation where relevant! Barriers 
to entry can be classified into three broad categories: natural (or economic) 
barriers; firm-created barriers; and government-created barriers. Each will be 
discussed in turn. 
NATURAL BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
Scale  economies 
There are a number of natural barriers to entry which  may affect the decision of 
new airlines to commence operations on Australian domestic routes and the 
success of those who do enter. (Natural barriers are those intrinsic to the 
technology at hand.) The primary barrier in this category is the existence of scale 
economies, whereby larger firms can produce at lower cost than smaller firms. 
A related technological barrier is the extent of capital required to enter: industries 
where capital requirements are substantial - for example if large investment in 
plant and equipment is required to enter - also tend to be those where scale 
economies are present. 
Although the economic literature influential in the debate on deregulation in  the 
United States pointed to no scale economies in aviation, subsequent research 
has shed important clarification on the matter. As discussed in more detail by 
Morrison (1991), there is now clear evidence that economies of aircraft size and 
economies of density exist. 
Economies of aircraft size exist as larger aircraft are cheaper to operate per 
available seat kilometre than smaller aircraft. For example, Bailey, Graham and 
Kaplan (1 985) show that for a 1000-mile trip, cost per revenue passenger mile is 
18 per cent lower for a 371-seat DClO-’IO than for a 115-seat DC9-30. These 
economies exist because larger aircraft can generate additional capacity without 
proportionate increases in crew size, fuel use, and the like. In addition, where 
an aircraft increases its seating capacity, fixed costs such as ground and station 
handling can be shared among a larger number of passengers, reducing available 
seat kilometre costs. 
Added passengers in a corridor greatly facilitate realisation of these economies 
without seriously sacrificing flight frequency. This gives rise to economies of 
density, in that more passengers travellinlg on a given route result in lower costs. 
1. Barriers  to  entry  have  been  characterised in two ways.  One  approach suggests that  barriers 
to entry  are  any  costs  faced  by  new  entrants.  The  other  approach is   more  narrow  definition 
which  suggests  that  any cost faced by  new  entrants to the  market  which  were  not  faced by
incumbent  firms  constitutes a barrier  to  entry. For the  present  purposes,  a  broader  definition 
is used,  identifying any factors  which  make  successful new  entry difficult. 
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Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984) found that if the number of passengers 
increases by 10 per cent, holding the route structure constant, costs increase by 
only 8 per cent. 
The issue then becomes: to what extent do  new entrants, by nature smaller than 
their established rivals, suffer a cost disadvantage? Otherwise stated: to what 
extent does having a larger network facilitate increased traffic densities and  the 
concomitant lower costs? 
In the United States, with a comparatively large number of cities, the 
hub-and-spoke system is a formidable tool in realising economies of density. 
Ratherthan being offered direct service, passengers from a given city are all flown 
to an intermediate hub, where they then change planes, join passengers from 
many otherorigins,  and proceed to theirfinal destinations. Thus, density between 
relevant city pairs is greatly enhanced. 
For example, assume an airline services passengers flying from five different 
origin cities, located somewhat near each other, to five destination cities, also 
located somewhat near each other as shown in figure 3.8. Some passengers 
from each of the five origin cities fly to each of the five destination cities, so that 
there are 25 city pairs in  the route system and 25 flights would be  needed  to 
service all passengers who wished to fly at agiven time. A hub-and-spoke system 
entails establishing a city located centrally between origin and destination cities 
as a hub. Flights from each of the origin cities would proceed to the hub, and, 
after passengers change planes, flights would proceed to each of the destination 
cities. With such a hub-and-spoke system, only ten flights would be needed to 
service all passengers who wished to fly at a given time. In effect, by initiating a 
hub-and-spoke system, the airline has achieved densities 2.5 times greater. 
Importantly, largerfirms, with more origin and destination points in their networks, 
can realise greater benefits from hub-and-spoke systems in facilitating 
economies of density and lower costs. With reference to the previous example, 
a firm with ten origins and ten destinations could boost densities fivefold by 
switching from direct flights to a hub-and-spoke system. The relatively greater 
cost advantage accruing to larger firms from adoption of hub-and-spoke systems 
has proven to be a serious problem forsmallerfirms, including new entrants trying 
to get a foothold in  the market. 
However, the situation is very different in Australia. Given the relatively small 
number of cities, which are widely dispersed and not geographically amenable 
to hub-and-spoke networks, the United States style hub-and-spoke system does 
not confer advantages. Moreover, a new entrant such as Compass can enter 
with a small number of aircraft, serve a small number of cities, and realise 
substantial traffic densities. 
Another potential benefit of increased network size in facilitating density 
economies is that additional routes can be used to feed traffic onto core routes. 
In the Australian system, routes other than  the  top 20 or 30 are very thin  and 
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Figure 3.6 Benefits of a hub-and-spoke network 
because of this they provide only a modest amount of feeder traffic to the  top 
routes and have relatively high costs. Therefore, unlike the United States, firms 
can operate on only a small number of routes in an integrated system and not 
suffer from cost disadvantages. Indeed, networks such as Compass’ can be 
advantageous in realising economies of density and aircraft size vis-a-vis Ansett’s 
and Australian’s more comprehensive networks. 
Thus, new, smallercarriers in  Australiado not appear to be at acostdisadvantage 
compared to established larger players. Indeed, new entrants may well be able 
to achieve lower costs if existing firms a1.e locked into particular cost structures. 
Compass, for example, has been able tal negotiate innovative pilot awards after 
the pilots’dispute, which have not been duplicated by Australian Airlines or Ansett 
Australia.2 
Compass has also been able to construct a route network and operating practices 
to reflect the current competitive environment, whereas the major airlines have 
had the perhaps more difficult task of rationalising existing services and fare 
2. Under  the  Industrial  Relations  Commission’si  award  which  applies to Ansett and Australian, 
A300  pilots  are  paid  a  base  salary of about $1 25 000 per year  and  are  paid  1/600th of this 
salary  for  every  flying  hour  over 55 hours  per  month.  Compass  Airlines’ A300 pilots,  which 
are  covered  by  a  different  award,  are  paid  a f18at rate of $1 25 000 per  year  regardless of hours 
flown. 
21 
BTCE Report 73 
structures from the period of regulation. For example, Compa.ss !-F!.:: achieved a 
competitive advantage by employing Melbourne as a centre c& up~raliaris o that 
economies can be achieved by concentrating aircraft servicing xi: cme p o i r r t  while 
also facilitating more efficient use of crews. The incumbent airBinse; ~ ~ i a ~ ~ w @ l l  have 
to close or rationalise facilities in order to achieve similar efficiencies. 
Capital  requirements 
Capital requirements have been identified as a barrier to entry ?Q n~any rraar'kets. 
It has been suggested in Tirole (1989) that entrants may haw? ,troub!e finding 
finance for their investments because of the risk to creditors. Bri !h@ c%se of 
Compass, the airline floated $50 million on the Sydney Stock E.xc;hango arid was 
oversubscribed by $15 m i l l i ~ n . ~  A number of institutional investors were 
reportedly among those providing funds for C o m p a ~ s . ~  
One aspect which facilitates entry into the aviation industry is That r.;?a.ray of the 
major capital components such as aircraft and terminals can be isa:ad at market 
rates. Although it is unclear whether the enthusiasm genesa&?d during the 
Compass float could be attained by other potential entrants attempling 'to raise 
funds, the Compass experience suggests that raising funds in the I ~ I C ~ T  of $65 
million needed to establish a comparable airline is achievable. 
Innovative approaches have been suggested by several potential entrants. AAA 
' Airlines, for example, proposes to develop an employee ownership strategy 
where the pilots working for  AAA will have 70 per cent  of the consis any's equity 
base through a trust fund. AAA also proposes cutting capital ,,quirements 
through the use of older, less expensive aircraft (AAA Airlines 19: I , I .  
In summary, there do not appear to be serious natural entry barriers into the 
Australian domestic airline industry. 
FIRM-CREATED BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
There are a number of barriers to entry in which competing firms play a role. In 
some cases firms may pursue a deliberate blocking strategy towards entrants. 
In other cases possession of a key resource is sufficient to deter entry. 
3. The  share  placement  occurred inJune  1990  and  Compass  shares  were listedon the  Sydney 
Stock  Exchange  on 5 July 1990. 
4. The  Commonwealth  Superannuation  Fund  Investment  Trust,  the  Queensland  Industry 
Development  Corporation,  AMP  and  Prudential  Assurance  were  reported in the Australian 
(7 June 1990) as contributing  a  total of $19 million.  Sarich  Corp  and AMP were  reported in 
the Canberra Times@ July 1990,  p.15) as holding 7.6 per  cent of Compass's  shares  and BT 
Australia  was  identified  as  another  investor. 
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Terminals 
Terminal facilities are crucial to the development of domestic aviation in a 
deregulated environment. In 1990 23 niillion passengers passed through the top 
ten airports, representing 90 per cent of all passenger movements in Australia. 
Table 3.2 shows the breakdown in passenger movements among these airports. 
TABLE 3.2  DOMESTIC  PASSENGER  MOVEMENTS AT MAJOR 
AIRPORTS 
Airport 
Passenger 
nwvements P ercentage of 
(‘000) all movements 
Sydney 
Melbourne 
Brisbane 
Adelaide 
Perth 
Canberra 
Coolangatta 
Cairns 
Hobart 
Alice  Springs 
Top  ten  airports 
Total  Australia 
6  690 
5 904 
3  486 
1 864 
1 399 
949 
892 
703 
535 
447 
23 171 
25  930 
27.0 
22.8 
13.4 
7.2 
5.4 
3.7 
3.4 
2.7 
2.1 
1.7 
89.4 
100.0 
Source DoTC (1 990). 
Clearly, access to adequate terminal facilities is a major issue for new entrants. 
Over 63 per cent of all passengers pass through Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane 
and new entrants wishing to engage in substantial competition with Australian 
and Ansett have to gain access to at hast those three airports. 
In December 1987, immediately prior to  the handover of airport management to 
the Federal Airports Corporation (FAC),  the Federal Government renegotiated 
the lease arrangements with Austrahan and Ansett for terminal facilities at 
Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Adelaide, Launceston and Coolangatta airports. 
One of the more significant aspects of the new lease conditions for Sydney is that 
they cover not only the existing terminals, but also significant expansion land 
(CofA 1987). Additionally the term of the  Sydney leases is  for 20 years for the 
premises and eight years for the expanision  land. An option to renew of around 
20 years for the expansion land where it has been developed, together with as 
much of the balance of the premises as are operationally connected with the new 
development, is also specified in the lease. 
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These arrangements may appear to give the incumbent airlines leases with 
options for around 28 years for all terminal space and land for terminal 
development at Sydney. However, the  FAC will soon complete development of 
an apron area at Sydney large enough to cater for the operation of  six domestic 
jets. This new apron areacomplements feasibility studies undertaken by the  FAC 
for common user terminal facilities. 
In order to provide some facilities for new entrants to the interstate aviation 
market, the leases required Ansett and Australian to provide gates at their 
terminals to new entrants, asfollows: Sydney and Melbourne, two each; Adelaide, 
Perth and Coolangatta, one each; and Launceston one by Ansett only. The FAC 
would be able to provide accommodation for new operators in existing facilities 
at Brisbane and Hobart (Collins 1990). 
Priorities between new entrant airlines were established according to the services 
which each airline intended to offer, with priorities within categories being 
determined by the Minister. The incumbent airlines were instructed to negotiate 
with third parties according to the priority list of new entrants. 
Where facilities have not been taken up, the airlines are required to make those 
facilities available to any third party carrier requesting them. This ensures that if 
the  top ranking new entrants fail to commence operations, others can  come  in 
and take up  the terminal facilities. 
The adequacy of terminal facilities is clearly one aspect which is crucial to the 
successful development of a deregulated aviation industry. The lease provisions 
have allowed Compass access to a limited number of terminals and so has 
obviously not been an insurmountable entry barrier. 
However, from Compass’s perspective there has been a number of problems. 
Having access to only two terminals at Sydney and Melbourne purportedly forced 
Compass to use wide-bodied aircraft. There have been numerous disputes about 
sub-lease conditions, delays in gaining terminal access, and the like. For 
example, the charge to be paid to Australian for terminal access has been 
disputed and is now being settled by arbitration. Although the limit of two 
terminals in key airports may well be a binding constraint on Compass’s growth 
at some point, terminal access has been adequate to establish a viable airline 
with an arguably advantageous route structure comprising the high density city 
pairs serviced by wide-bodied aircraft. 
Currently it is possible for the lessees (Australian and Ansett) to operate fewer 
services through each gate in the terminal than the sub-lessees, indicating that 
the resources use is not uniformly distributed. The FAC has indicated that further 
terminal development will be on the basis of a demonstrable need for gates. In 
this situation they could well point out the higher utilisation rates at new entrant 
gates and say that until Ansett and Australian reach these rates the  FAC would 
be reluctant to expand terminal facilities. In the medium term, expansion land 
has been leased to the major carriers, so that further terminal development at the 
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main airports will be closely linked with their operations. This means that in  the 
medium term new entrants will probably have one of their competitors as their 
landlord. Given that the leases to the incumbent airlines operate at least until 
2007, while the compulsory provision of sub-leases for the new entrants expires 
in  the year 2000, an additonal question1 is: what facilities will be available for new 
entrants in the 21st century? 
Terminal access looks to be a more serious issue for potential airline entrants 
than it has been for Compass. There is basically room for  only  one more new 
entrant at major airports, in so far as knsett's terminals remain available. Even 
this one entrant may  have additional prloblerns, as Ansett has purportedly offered 
two gates at Melbourne 1.5 kilometres apart. 
Moreover, while there is provision for other  new entrants to take up available 
facilities if the front runners drop out of the race, there  is no provision to cover a 
situation where negotiations between a landlord airline and a prospective tenant 
airline drag on, effectively denying a potential entrant an opportunity to take up 
the facilities provided to new entrants. 
In summary, the terminal access available to  new entrants, although limited, has 
allowed an actual entrant and does make possible the potential entry  of another 
new carrier. Provision of this degree of access has greatly facilitated the 
establishment of structural conditions to achieve an adequate degree of 
competition under deregulation. 
Horizontal  and  vertical  integration 
Horizontal and vertical integration between existing firms can in some cases 
enlarge barriers to entry  for  new  firms.  The airlines' acquisition of feeder airlines, 
holiday destinations and travel agencies could  be seen as attempts to  develop 
greater access to the demand for airline services. By acquiring firms in industries 
which generally supply passengers to the domestic aviation market, the airlines 
could be seeking a competitive advantage over new entrants. The question 
arises as to what extent these acquisiti'ons form barriers to entry. 
Linkages  with  other  airlines 
One potential barrier is the linking together, by ownership or agreement, of 
markets which are providing airline passenger services but which are spatially 
separated (different city pairs). The main objective of such a strategy from an 
airline's point of view is to enhance the possibilities that travellers will feed into 
the airline's network. If successful, such a strategy can enhance densities on 
major routes and reduce the costs of  selrvices provided on a seat kilometre basis. 
Actual ownership of feeder airlines is one option; another is to attract customers 
by making the network connections seamless - providing co-ordinated 
schedules, checked-through baggage, code sharing, single ticketing and 
joint-tour products, single terminals and so on. 
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Although the major airlines are greatly integrated with feeder airlines, and  have 
increased this integration since deregulation, there does not appear to be any 
evidence that lack of feeder airline ownership constitutes a major barrier to entry. 
Prior to deregulation, the major Australian domestic airlines already had links with 
both regional and commuter airlines and with international airlines either by 
ownership or alliance. Of the 45 Australian commuter carriers existing before 
deregulation, at least 20 were affiliated in some way with Ansett and 15 with 
Australian (AFR  1990a). Deregulation merely added to the incentives for such 
integration. 
The takeover of Eastwest by TNT-News Corporation in July 1987 could be 
deemed to be the first strategic response to imminent deregulation. More 
recently, Australian has acquired full ownership of Eastern Australia Airlines, 
Sunstate Mildura and Sunstate Queensland and launched a new regional airline, 
Australian Airlink, to fly some of its low density routes along the Queensland coast 
as well as Cairns to Darwin, Yulara and Alice Springs. Figure 3.9 shows the 
current ownership structure of Australian domestic passenger airlines. 
Internationally, Australian has entered into a close relationship with United 
Airlines and has had commercial agreements with Air New Zealand, Singapore 
Airlines, UTA, Canadian Airlines International and British Airways. Ansett had a 
long-standing relationship with Qantas which expired early in 1991 and has been 
reported as negotiating with several foreign airlines. 
Integration with travel agents and firms  providing complementary products 
Airlines may also opt for linking together, by ownership or agreement, markets 
which form an input-output  or output-output sequence. For example, links may 
be formed between an airline and inputs which might otherwise be purchased, 
such as aircraft leasing services, travel agents orcomputer reservations systems. 
Links may also be formed between airlines and services which may be  used 
sequentially, such as hotels, hire cars  and tourist resorts. Once again, such a 
strategy can have benefits for an airline’s economies of densities and lead to 
improvements in  load factors. 
Ownership of travel agencies is perhaps the most serious barrier of this type. 
Ansett Australia and Australian Airlines have sought greater market access by 
purchasing and forming strategic alliances with travel agencies since 
deregulation. Ansett has reportedly taken a significant interest in  the  third largest 
ticket consolidator, Metro Travel, replacing Australian as the preferred domestic 
carrier. Ansett has bought the Traveland chain of agencies and joined forces 
with Coles-Myer to create another sales network. In August 1990, 
Coles-Myer-Ansett Travel purchased the ANZ  Bank’s extensive travel business 
with 40 outlets, making it one of Australia’s five largest travel agency groups. 
In September 1990, Australian retaliated by purchasing Westpac Travel, with 42 
outlets and  an annual turnover of $200 million, predominantly from corporate 
accounts (AFR 1990b). Australian has moved to develop closer relations with a 
number of othertravel agents, particularly large volume agents and consolidators 
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Figure 3.9 Ownership structure of Australlan domestic passenger airlines 
, 
Australian 
Airlines Ltd 1 Compass 1 
Australian 
Regional  Airlines 
Sunstate  Airlines 
(QLD)  Pty  Ltd (1 00%) 
Sunstate  Airlines 
(Mildura) Pty Ltd (100%) 
Australian Regional 
Airlines (QLD) 
Ply Ltd (1 00%) 
- Eastern  Australia 
Airlines (1 00%) 
- Air  Queensland 
Pty Ltd (100%) 
Australian  Airlink 
- Pty Ltd (100%) 
2 
B 
4 
m 
BTCE Report 73 
who provide tickets to small travel agencies not linked to computer reservations 
systems. In particular, travel agencies which are owned and operated by an 
airline, and may be perceived by the public as independent, could provide an 
important advantage to that airline. 
In October 1991, Compass doubled its commission for travel agents selling 
Compass class tickets to 20 per cent, four times Ansett and Australian’s usual 
commission. It also boosted its commission on discounted tickets from 9 percent 
to 12.5 per cent (DCN 1991). These initiatives provide a powerful incentive for 
travel agents to sell Compass tickets. 
Ownership of firms in related industries does not necessarily constitute a barrier 
to entry for new airlines. What is more difficult to determine is whether the 
operational policies of these related firms are developed in a prejudicial manner 
to new competitors. At this stage there does not appear to be much evidence to 
support that hypothesis. 
Does the airlines’ ownership of holiday destinations constitute a barrier to entry? 
It may be an inducement for holiday makers to pick up a package prepared by 
the airline in conjunction with the holiday resort, but Compass has demonstrated 
that ownership is not  a prerequisite for developing attractive holiday packages. 
Strategic  alliances 
Strategic alliances may provide an alternative avenue to integration in facilitating 
entry barriers. Strategic alliances have been developed with overseas carriers, 
regional and commuter airlines, hotels, car rental agencies, and  travel agencies. 
Australian, for example, entered into arrangements with Hertz for preferential 
rates and simplified hiring arrangements for Flight Deck members, while Ansett 
has a preferential rates arrangement with Avis for Golden Wing Club members. 
These affiliations are more loosely based than equity holding and therefore there 
must be financial advantages to both parties. For this reason it is unlikely that 
many firms would willingly enter into sole agencies with the airlines and  ignore 
business being generated by new entrants. Certainly Compass has a number of 
arrangements with firms in the travel and hospitality industries. 
Compass has also endeavoured to develop a number of strategic alliances . For 
example, it has signed a joint marketing agreement with Budget Rent-A-Car which 
is designed to develop fly-drive packages, including hotel accommodation and 
with other airlines, developed airfare and accommodation packages to Cairns in 
conjunction with the Queensland Travel and Tourist Corporation. Compass also 
has opportunities for ‘feed’ from tourists who book through the Sabre/Fantasia 
Computer Reservations System. 
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Frequent  flier  programs 
The most recent airline tactic arguably intended to heighten entry barriers is  the 
introduction of frequent flier programs. The experience in the United States 
suggests that frequent flier programs add to yield erosion. However, the carriers 
generally regard them as an expensive, but successful, marketing tool (Brenner, 
Leet & Schott 1986). Such programs have clearly proven to be a major barrier 
to entry for  new entrants in the United States and have attracted criticism from 
the United States General Accounting Office because of their potentially 
anticompetitive nature (Avmarkl991). Frequent flier programs are an example 
of what is known as a rebate-coupon device, which has the effect of deterring 
entry by creating the need for a new entrant to establish a network of a certain 
size. 
Recent experience in Australia suggests that Compass has not followed Ansett’s 
and Australian’s lead in developing frequent flier programs, but instead seeks to 
offer more lucrative fare discounts to passengers who would normally pay full 
fares.5 The fact that Compass, despite a limited route structure, can compete for 
approximately 60 percent of domestic p’assengers means that it is less vulnerable 
to frequent flier programs than its counterparts in the United States. 
In conclusion, firm-created barriers to entry generally do not appear to be 
insurmountable impediments to new entrants in Australia, with ownership of travel 
agencies perhaps the most serious problem for existing new entrants, although 
the initial capacity constraints imposed by the terminal leases could inhibit further 
expansion of domestic aviation by new carriers. 
INSTITUTIONAL  BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
Currently international carriers, including Qantas, cannot compete on Australian 
domestic routes for passengers. Unlike the situation which prevails in the United 
States, where the same carriers serve both international and domestic markets, 
Qantas is not permittedto carry domestic: passengers (interlining rights excluded), 
while Australian domestic carriers are not permitted to serve international 
markets. This important entry restriction could be relaxed if conditions warranted, 
and provides afurther mechanism to increase the level of competition should the 
market structure evolve in a way that colmpetition proves inadequate. 
5.  Compass  offered  two  free  tickets  with  every  Compass  class  purchase to the same 
destination.  Compass  claimed  its  cornpetitiors’  frequent flier programs would only  offer  the 
same  free  flights  after 24 return  trips. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm posits that alterations in marklet structure will have major consequences 
for firm conduct and, in turn, market performance. Moreover, the theory suggests 
that the specific changes in structure which have occurred since deregulation - 
the Compass entry bringing about a decrease in market concentration, an 
increase in capacity, and an increase in1 firm heterogeneity- would be expected 
to greatly intensify rivalry among firms. ‘This chapter examines airline rivalry, both 
longitudinally, over the lead-up to and during the first year of deregulation, and 
with a cross-sectional analysis of discount fares during the intense 
June-July-August skirmish. A chronology of the events comprising the 
developments in competition is at appendix I. 
PRICE COMPETITION 
The pricing policies pursued by the airlines have been a major feature since 
deregulation. A number of stages in the development of fares can be identified. 
These include the fare initiatives taken1 by the airlines before deregulation, the 
discounting during January to fill seats in this traditional period of low demand, 
the major sustained discounting campaign which began in late June and the 
airlines’ ongoing reaction to the recession. From this longitudinal assessment 
the impact of Compass’s entry into the market in intensifyi,ng competition is clear. 
In addition to this approach, a cross-sectional regression analysis of fare 
discounting during the height of the Ju,ne-August fare war is presented to test 
more formally the hypothesis that structural features such as the number of 
competitors and the presence of Compass are primary determinants of the 
intensity of price competition. 
LONGITUDINAL  ANALYSIS OF FARE: DISCOUNTING SINCE 
DEREGULATION 
Before the pilots’ dispute, both Australian and Ansett had an almost identical 
schedule of discounts. These  discountls were characterised by their long-term, 
stable nature, providing discounts of between 15 per cent and 45 per cent. 
Conditions typically required advance booking, minimum and maximum stay 
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away periods, seat availability limitations, cancellation penalties and, on  the 45 
per cent discount fare, no choice by the traveller of the particular flight, only the 
day of the flight. Eastwest had a slightly different discount schedule. 
Lead-up  to  deregulation 
In early 1990, as the effectsofthe pilots'dispute diminished and the airlines began 
to prepare forderegulation,  the number and types of discounts began to increase 
and a number of discounting strategies were introduced: 
. time deadlines were set on the availability of discounts, which had previously 
been open-ended; 
specific market segments were targeted, such as the over 60s; 
discounting strategies varied between the airlines (not simply copying each 
other); 
discounts were provided only on certain flights; and 
and Ansett. 
off-peak, late evening and night flight discounts were introduced by Australian 
Post-deregulation  discounting 
The January campaign, introduced by Ansett on 1 January 1991 with discounts 
of up  to 61 per cent and followed (and extended) by Australian, was  the first 
specific discount 'campaign' instituted by  an airline to boost sales over a wide 
range of routes in a quiet period exacerbated by an increase in capacity. 
The May 'Recession Busters' campaign, instituted by Compass on 3 May and 
followed six days later by Australian and Ansett, was the first instance of an airline 
overlapping an initial discount offer with a second, shallower, but longer, offering. 
It was also the occasion of the first super cheap same-day spot sale ($100 
one-way tickets for travel from Sydney or Melbourne to Perth). 
The  mid year discount war, which was begun on 21 June by Compass, was not 
fundamentally different to the previous discount campaigns. It was no deeper 
than the May campaign, which had offered discounts of up to 70 per cent and 
$100 spot fares to Perth, nor was it any wider than the January fare war, with 
Ansett then offering discounts on 150 routes (followed by Australian) and Ansett 
Express joining the discounting. However, it did bring together the best features 
of the previous two campaigns. It also operated for a longer period than  the 
previous campaigns, with the sale period lasting (with extensions) from late June 
into September. Previous sales had lasted for no more than a month. The period 
of use (again with extensions) was nine to ten months, compared with the May 
campaign which provided a 12 month period of  use. Also the conditions were 
similar to the May fare war, with tickets to be paid for within 72 hours of booking 
and non-refundable. 
One of its most significant features was its intensity, with a greater number of fare 
changes than previously and more overlapping of a series of mini discount battles 
over the period June to August. It was a natural development from the earlier 
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campaigns, with increasing sophistication being brought to bear in areas such as 
width of discounting (in terms of the number of routes affected), the increased 
use of the one-off sale of seats on a parlticular flight, targeting of business groups 
with shallower discounts (particularly by Compass, who had less to lose through 
diversion of premium fare business passengers than the other airlines) and 
incremental increases in width, depth and duration of discounting. 
Discounting continued into September and October, although initially not with the 
same intensity as in July and August. However, discounting became more 
intense on 3 October when Ansett and Australian commenced a further round of 
reductions. Compass refused to be undersold and dropped its fares still further, 
to be then matched by Ansett and Australian. 
It is notable that even at the time of finalising this report in November 1991, 
Compass has triggered a further round of discounting which has been matched 
by Australian and Ansett. This discount, war has seen the deepest discounts to 
date (Sydney to Melbourne or Brisbane and Melbourne to Adelaide for $100 
return), indicating that short term deep discounting in slack periods may well 
become a feature of competition in the industry. 
Experience so far suggests that discounting will continue in  arather unpredictable 
pattern, with periods of intensity and lulls, and that expectations of increases in 
demand will not necessarily preclude discounting campaigns. 
Analysis of trends in discount  wars 
Overthe past year, discounting has changed in a number of ways, not necessarily 
just as a result of deregulation. First, discounts have become deeper, given that 
highly restricted 45 per cent discounts on full economy,fares were generally the 
best available prior to deregulation, while less restricted discounts of 60 to 70 per 
cent were available during 1991. 
Second, there has been an increase iln the variety and innovation of fares 
available to the public, such as the two for one offer from Compass and the more 
recent frequent flier programs. Also, the airlines have  not always followed each 
other in discounting, but have sometimes provided different forms of discounting. 
Third, Ansett, Australian and Compass have each been responsible for some of 
the discounting initiatives. In contrast, Eastwest does not appear to have taken 
the lead to the same extent. 
Fourth, the number of routes on which discounts have been available has 
fluctuated. In the January discounting battle the range was quite wide, not 
restricted to the routes serviced by Compass. However, in the early stages of 
the June discounting the range was restricted largely to the Compass routes, but 
laterwas widened. Also, in the latter campaign, routes to Adelaide were targeted, 
presumably in anticipation of Compass’s entry into the market. 
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Fifth, restrictions on time of purchase for the deeper range of discounts have been 
imposed. Whereas prior to deregulation a schedule of discounts was available 
indefinitely (those discounts are largely still available), the general practice now 
is to make new discounts available for short periods. This presumably allows the 
airlines to maintain tight control of fares and to make quick changes to fare 
structures in response to changes in demand, marketing initiatives by other 
airlines or other factors. It also allowscontinual introduction of new discounts with 
their attendant publicity and enables the airlines to lock in future demand  and 
increase cash flow. 
Sixth, restrictions on the periods within which the flight must be taken have been 
imposed and vary widely, from one day to one year, depending upon  the  type 
and depth of the discount. Discounts designed to fill particular or anticipated 
pockets of empty seats are often deeper and have greater restrictions upon them 
(for example, $1 00 one-way discounts between Sydney and Perth). 
Seventh’, discounting promotion has changed from an emphasis on the 
percentage of the discount to an emphasis on the amount saved, and particularly 
on  the amount of the actual discounfed fare. 
As with, the discount regimes operating before deregulation, there  has  been a 
continuation of restrictions oyticketing (usually now within 72 hours of booking), 
rebooking and cancellations, with most fares excluding refunds and limiting 
changes to travel plans. 
Motivation  for  increased  emphasis  on  discounting 
A number of factors have influenced the actions (and reactions) qf the airlines in 
the discounting campaigns. Reduced demand in the economic recession has 
induced each airline to maintain its overall customer base at the expense of its 
competitors. However, as the recession has extended across the whole period 
of deregulation, it does not adequately account for the increased intensity of 
discounting through the first ten, months of 1991. The airlines did not undertake 
this level of discounting during previous recessions. 
Allied to this has been the dramatic increase in domestic airline capacity, from 
around 360 million available seat kilometres (ASKs) per week in  mid  October 
1990 to about 530 million ASKs in  mid October 1991 (DoTC 1991 b), an increase 
of about 45 per cent. About 40 per cent of the increase has been a direct result 
of Compass’s entry. 
Seasonal variations have had some impact upon particular discount campaigns. 
The January clearance sale instigated by Ansett certainly fell into this category, 
as the airline sought to fill, seats in a traditionally quiet month. August and 
September were’also described by an Ansett spokesman (Wahlquist 1991) as 
usually pretty flat. 
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However, it is the increasingly competitive nature of the market which is having 
the most impact upon the airlines. Much of the competition has resulted from the 
entry of Compass, as the airlines strove first to prepare for its arrival and then to 
counter its manoeuvres. It  was  Compalss which contributed a significant share 
of the increase in capacity, and then used a variety of marketing strategies and 
tactics to fill its aircraft. Both Ansett ,and Australian have also taken up the 
challenge, competing vigorously not only with Compass but also with each other 
over their entire networks. 
CROSS-SECTIONAL  ANALYSIS  OF WINTER '91 FARE  DISCOUNTS 
The longitudinal analysis discussed above suggests that the market has been 
more competitive since deregulation. In1 particular, it appears that Compass, by 
adding to the number of competitors, adlding capacity and providing a 'maverick 
in  the market has had a major impact across a number of routes, as predicted by 
the theory. To shed further light on the importance of these structural features, 
a cross-sectional analysis of discount fares was undertaken. 
Data and methodology 
The basic hypotheses are that the number of competitors, and the presence of 
Compass, on a route will have significant effects on the level of discount fares: 
as  the number of competitors increases', fares are expected to be lower; when 
Compass is present on a route, fares are also expected to be lower. 
These hypotheses were put to a formal test through regression analysis using a 
cross-sectional sample of airline routes. In assessing the impact of competition 
on fares, the distance of the route and the number of passengers on the route 
were included as control variables, primarily to reflect cost variations with stage 
length and density. The model had the general form 
log (FARE) = log (K) + A. 1 0 ~ 1  (DIST) + B. log (COMP) + 
C. log (YDUM) + D. log (PAX) 
where the dependent FARE variables are, alternatively 
DF Maximum discount fare 
DF/K Maximum discount fare per kilometre 
and the independent variables are 
DIST Great circle distance 
COMP Number of competitors on the route 
YDUM Compass dummy variable 
PAX Number of uplift-discharge passengers 
K The estimated constant term  in the equations 
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The sample consisted of the top 100 city pairs by passenger uplifts and 
discharges for the year ending 31 December 1990. These routes represent a 
diverse range of operating conditions for the airlines and accounted for 12.9 
million uplifts and discharges or 99.6 per cent of all passengers carried in  that 
year. The routes range in density from Melbourne-Sydney with 2.52 million 
uplifts and discharges to Broome-Darwin  with 3482 uplifts and discharges. The 
distances flown on these 100 routes were between 92 kilometres and 3436 
kilometres.  The  average  maximum  discount  offered  across  these  routes  was 
43  per  cent of the  standard  economy  fare. 
The fare chosen as the dependent variable was the best available discount fare 
during the JuneJuly-August fare war. This fare skirmish, as the most intense 
to date, clearly reflects the atmosphere of the deregulated marketplace. In 
addition, the relative stability of these discount fares overa more than two-month 
period facilitated data gathering. 
In one pair of regressions the dependent variable was regressed against distance, 
the number of competitors, a Compass dummy variable and the number of uplifts 
and discharges within the flight. In the second series the number of uplifts and 
discharges was dropped from the equation. The results of these regressions are 
shown in table 4.1. 
Summary of results 
The results provide support forthe importance of competition in determining fares. 
The  coefficient  for  the  number of competitors  was  negative  and  statistically 
TABLE 4.1 REGRESSION RESULTS - DISCOUNT FARES 
Great  Number  Uplift- tf 
Dependent Constant circle of Compass  di charge 
variable term distance competitors dummy  passengers 
Discount  fare 1.99039 0.52822  -0.21323 -0.25420  - .036   ,7321 
(0.2564)  (13.01  69)(-3.7990)  (-2.6123)  (-1.7764) 
Discount  fare  1.58110  0.53915  -0.25822  -0.3 5 9  .7232
(0.2593)  (14.9282)  (-5.0980)  (-3.4542) 
Discount  fare 1 .g9039  -0.47179  -0.21323  -0.24520  -0.03620  ,7489
per  kilometre  (0.2564) (-13.0619)  (-3.7990)  (-2.6123)  (-1.7764) 
Discount  fare  1.581  10  -0.46085  -0.25822  -0.30559  .74 6
per  kilometre  (0.2593) (-12.7603)  (-5.0980)  (-3.4542) 
,. Not  applicable 
Note All bracketed  figures  are  t-statistics  except  for  those  under  the  constant  terms  which  refer 
Source BTCE  estimates. 
to the  standard  error. 
36 
Chapter 4 
significant, indicating that the degree olf discounts is a function of the number of 
competitors operating on each route. Even when controlling for the effect of 
Compass, additional competition results in lower rates. This indicates that 
competition between the two incumbent airlines is resulting in significantly lower 
discount rates. The statistically significant negative coefficient on the Compass 
dummy variable implies that the presence of Compass has an additional impact 
on discount fares, over and above merelly adding one more competitor on a route. 
The sign on the distance independent variable was as expected, positive and 
significant when the fare was used as the dependent variable, negative and 
significant when the fare per kilometre was used. To  the extent that fares reflect 
costs on particular routes, the fare taper present in  the sample provides evidence 
of economies of stage  length. 
The coefficient on number of passengelrs  was negative, but  was only marginally 
significant. Again, to  the extent that fares reflect costs, the lower fares in denser 
markets provide an indication that airlines are adjusting prices to reflect 
economies of density. 
THE TRADE-OFF  BETWEEN  PRICE AND SERVICE  QUALITY IN THE 
BUSINESS  MARKET 
Service quality and price are the two major factors determining consumer choice 
for airline travel. The balance between these two is different for the business and 
non-business markets. There is no evid,ence that the balance has shifted for the 
non-business traveller, who has always been price sensitive and has predictably 
reacted to the discounting battles. Hlowever, there are indications that this 
balance has shifted in the business travlel market in recent months. 
The historical perception forthe business market had been that flexibility of travel 
plans and other elements of service quadity were more important than price and 
that business travellers were prepared iro pay a significant premium in order to 
maintain that quality of service. Since deregulation the airlines have continued 
to pay attention to service quality prov,ision, competing in this arena in order 
particularly to attract the business traveller, although all airline passengers have 
benefited to some extent. The arrival of  ICompass on many business routes with 
its spacious one-class cabin may havle prompted some of these initiatives, 
particularly the upgrading of business class by both Ansett and Australian in order 
to provide a product sufficiently different from Compass to attract the 
service-oriented business market. 
Details of the initiatives taken by the aidines to compete for patronage through 
service quality are discussed in detail in chapter 6 and  in appendix II. 
However, in addition to competition in service quality, deregulation has also seen 
the new phenomenon of discounting aimled  at the market for business travellers. 
This commenced in July 1991 when Compass offered discount ‘Freedom Fares’. 
These tickets were available for a month1 and useable for nearly a year, without 
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advance specification of day  or time of travel. The Sydney-Melbourne fare was 
set at $95, slightly higher than the maximum discount fare of the time but 
significantly lessmthan Ansett and  ‘Australian’s-standard economy fare of  $229. 
Australian followed, as did Ansett when Compass introduced a second, shallower 
round  ofdiscdunts (‘Business Pass’)  forthe business market (Sydney-Melbourne 
$125). The’introduction of frequent flier programs did not see the  end of such 
discounting, with Compass introducing books of discounted tickets, available 
indefinitely, and Australian introducing a discount regime similar to the Business 
Pass  and available for purchase until March 1992. 
Another indication of the trade-off between price and service quality in the 
business market is that business travellers may be  taking advantage of other 
discounts which require significant concessions in  the  area of booking flexibility 
- concessions not previously thought feasible in that market. A recent report 
(Dorman 1991) suggested that a high ,percentage of business travellers  were 
travelling on discounts and that corporations were actively hunting for cheap 
fares, even where this meant making advance bookings. 
As Dorman suggested, this  trend seriously threatens the strategies of the  major 
two airlines, ,particularly Ansett, as it upgraded business and first class and 
reduced’the flexibility of seating arrangements at the expense of economy class. 
It is much more to the advantage of Compass Airlines, which has only one class 
of seating  and has adopted a different long-term strategy of actively seeking 
business,  travellers with moderate, across-the-board, discounting, a generous 
seat pitch  and subtle marketing techniques such as seating ‘suits’  at’the front end 
of,the plane to create a de facto business class without the  extra  cost.  Compass 
has, obviously ‘had some success with this strategy; the Roy Morgan survey for 
the Septemberquarterfound that Compass had 8.9 percent of the  business  travel 
market, up  from 5.3 per cent for the previous  quarter  (Blackburn 1991). 
A related element of the quality-price ,trade-off has been the introduction of 
giveaways and bonuses. Both Ansett and Australian, have used this form of 
marketing in  the fight for market share, but travellers may prefer a discount  on 
their  ticket,  pqrticularly  those from companies which are  closely  supervising  travel 
budgets  in the depressed economy. Compass has to date resisted such forms 
of giveaway promotion. 
Both the main incumbent airlines are now utilising  the frequent flier  incentive 
scheme, which allows free air  travel in addition to other  gifts,  in  their  efforts  to 
attract the loyalty of business passengers. 
The value, of the frequent flier programs as a form of discounting must  not be 
overestimated. Apart from t,he entry cost  and  the limitations on use ofthe ‘reward’ 
ticket, the  level of discount is  quite modest. For instance, under the Australian 
Airlines’ scheme on the Sydney-Melbourne route, 13  full fare economy tickets 
are,iequired for one free ticket,  giving a discount of about 7 per cent. If discount 
tickets are purchased, then 19 are  required’for a free ticket,  giving  an  additional 
discount  on  the discount ‘fare of about 5 per cent. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE  CONSUMERS'  PERSPECTIVE -FARES 
In this chapter, the extent to which conslumers  have benefited from deregulation 
in the form of lower fares is investigated. 
AVERAGE  REVENUE DATA 
Comparison between Australian  and  United  States  data 
Figure 5.1 shows real average revenue per passenger kilometre for the main 
domestic carriers in Australia and  the United States for the period 1981 to 1990. 
Over this period there was a significant diecrease in real prices in  the dereguiated 
United States environment, but only a marginal decrease in the regulated 
Australian environment. 
A direct comparison between the Australian and United States figures, involving 
a detailed analysis of factor inputs, is outside the scope of this study. However, 
on the assumption that revenue per RPK data reflect the underlying cost 
structures of the industries, the data in fi'gure 5.1 suggest that there is  scope for 
significant cost rationalisation in Australi,an domestic aviation. 
Prices  Surveillance  Authority  monitoring of air  fares 
In February 1991 the Government directed the Prices Surveillance Authority 
(PSA) to monitor movements in average 'fares on interstate routes. The PSA has 
so far collected quarterly data  on average fares and passenger numbers from the 
airlines for each of the top 20 routes and has aggregated these to provide 
industry-average fare indices. The Authority's analysis of these fare data has 
focused on the seventeen top 20 routes which are either interstate or have a 
minimum of three operators. 
The PSA has reported that, on these seventeen routes, aggregate average 
revenue has fallen by 9.9 per cent in nominal terms between the September 1990 
and June 1991 quarters (PSA 1991). Aldjusted for inflation this means that the 
average fare on these routes fell by 12.2 per cent  in real terms. 
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Figure 5.1 Real average revenue per passenger kilometre, 1981 to 1990 
Moreover, since over 80 per  cent of passengers fly on the  top 20 routes, there 
has clearly been a significant reduction of fares system-wide. Even under the 
very conservative assumption that average fares did not change on the other 
routes, the fall in  the  real verage fare across the entire domestic aviation network 
was about 10 per cent  by the end of June 1991. 
Since June, it is likely that average fares have fallen even further as the airlines 
have been engaged in the most intense fare war to date. This argument is 
strengthened by Bureau estimates that about 40 percent of passengers travelled 
on discount fares before deregulation and that this figure had increased to about 
50 per cent by May 1991 and to between 60 and 70 per cent by October 1991. 
Although the benefits of lower fares appear to be greatest on routes with high 
traffic densities, the benefits have extended throughout the trunk network. Table 
5.1 provides a breakdown of the best available discount fares and competition 
on  two groups of trunk routes in August 1991. 
The maximum discounts on the routes directly linking Sydney, Melbourne, 
Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth averaged 63 per cent off the standard economy 
fare offered by Australian and Ansett, while on a sample of 21 other routes in  the 
top 40, the maximum discount was 58 per cent less than the standard economy 
fare on average. 
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TABLE 5.1 TRUNK ROUTE CHARACTERISTICS, AUGUST 1991 
Average  Average 
discount number of Compass 
farea competitor2 presence' 
Group I d  
Group 2e 
63 3.4 100 
58 2.9 24 
~~ 
Notes a.  The  discount is measured  as  the  percentage off the full 
b. The  number of competitors  is  defined as RPT  domestic 
economy  fare. 
airlines  operating on tlhat route. 
c.  The  Compass  presence in Group  1  and  Group 2 is the 
percentage of  routes in each  category  served  by  Compass. 
d.  Group  1  refers to Adelaide-Melbourne,  Adelaide-Sydney, 
Brisbane-Melbourne,  Hrisbane-Sydney,  Melbourne- 
Sydney. 
e. Group 2 refers to a  selection of 21 trunk  routes in the top 
40 which  have  a  capital  city as an  origin or a  destination. 
While this difference is relatively small, it is consistent with the results of the 
regression analysis discussed in chapter 4, which concluded that route density, 
the number of competitors and the presence of Compass all influence the 
magnitude of the discount fares available. 
FARE  CHANGES ON THE  SYDNEY-MELBOURNE  ROUTE 
By analysing the details of fare movements on one route, such as 
Melbourne-Sydney,  it  is possible to de'velop a better understanding of changes 
in the level of average fares across the network. 
Melbourne-Sydney is Australia's major air route and the passenger market is 
largely time-sensitive business travellers. Nearly 20 per cent of all domestic 
passengers, some 2.5 million, flew on tlhis route in 1990. 
The impact of deregulation on fares on1 this route is shown in figure 5.2. From 
this figure there are  four factors to note about discount fares. 
Firstly, prior to deregulation the best available discount was 45 per cent off the 
standard economy fare (about $1 12 one way); this increased to 50 per cent off 
immediately after deregulation. 
Secondly, the airlines have introduced a range of deep discounts at three different 
times of the year, in particular during October 1990, January-February 1991, and 
June-July-August 1991. The short October fare war saw discount fares fall to 
$79 one way (66 per cent off the  full economy fare) although this discount level 
rose to $95 (58 per cent off the economy fare) at the end of October 1991. 
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Figure 5.2 Melbourne-Sydney' real air fares, 1987 to 1991 
' ,  
' Thirdly, in real terms the'depth of discounting has more than .offset the rises in 
economy and premium fares, e,specially when there are indications that the 
business  and first class sections of the market are contracting  (refer  below). This 
is  corroborated by the PSA data for average , ,  fares. 
Fourthly, even the full' fare 'offered by Compass is a substantial discount 
(approximately 20 per ce'rit) off the economy fares offered by Ansett and 
Australian. 
While discount fares are clearly lower,'standard economy fares have  risen  from 
$408  return in September 1990 to $458  in October 1991, or 12.3 per  cent  in 
nominal terms:  The airlines  justified a87.4 per cent rise'in  nominal.fares  in  October 
1990 on the grounds of fuel  price rises due to the Gulf crisis. If this  is  taken  into 
consideration, the nominal fare increased by 4.6 per cent in the first year of 
deregulation. This increase  in  full fares is consistent with a  yield management 
policy which dictates.  a higher price  be  paid  for,.the  convenience, of 'on demand' 
service. Trends in the  United States since deregulation  have also revealed an 
increasing  differential  between,  full',  and discount fares, with those  customers 
unable  to purchase in advance (with' presumably very inelastic  demands)  paying 
relatively high fares. , I  
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The average real fare fell by 10.8 per cent on the Melbourne-Sydney route 
between the September 1990 and Julne 1991 quarters, based on PSA (1991). 
The sharpest fall was during the March 1991 quarter when the real average fare 
fell  by over 6.2 per cent. Figures for the September 1991 quarter may indicate a 
larger fall as a result of the extended Idiscount  war which has impacted on this 
route. 
PASSENGER  GROWTH  AND  DISCOUNTING 
Over  the  period between the September 1990 and September 1991 quarters 
there has  been heavy discounting by the airlines. This partly explains why record 
patronage levels have been achieved in spite of the recession, which would 
usually be expected to reduce the level of patronage on the domestic network. 
Figure 5.3 shows domestic airline revenue passenger kilometres since 
deregulation. Note that the September 1991 quarter RPK figure is significantly 
higher than the June 1991 quarter filgure, partly reflecting the impact of the 
June-August discount war. The airlines performed a record total of 16.1 billion 
RPKs for the  year ending 30 September 1991, representing an increase of 16.7 
per cent and 42.5 per cent over the years 1987-88 and 1988-89 (DoTC 1991 c). 
. . .  
a Australian  group 
Dec. quarter March quarter June quarter Sept. quarter 
1990 1991 19911 1991 
Source DoTC (1 991 c). 
Figure 5.3 Domestic airline revenue passenger kilometres since deregulation 
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Figure 5.4 Domestic airline available seat kilometres since deregulation 
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Figure 5.5 Patronage on domestic airlines since deregulatlon 
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Figure 5.4 shows domestic airline available seat kilometres. Compared to RPKs, 
ASKs have increased at a slower rate between the June 1991 and September 
1991 quarters, which explains why load factors reached record levels during the 
September 1991 quarter of 79.7 per cent (DoTC 1991~).  ASKs increased by 15.6 
per cent during this period compared to an increase in RPKs of 35.4 per cent. 
The increase in quarterly passenger numbers between the December 1990 and 
September 1991 quarters shown in figure 5.5 reflects the impact of extended 
heavy discounting. The record increase in passenger numbers of 31 per cent 
was less than  the increase for RPKs in figure 5.3. This suggests that the average 
stage length flown on the network is; longer now than at the beginning of 
deregulation, probably as a result of increased patronage on routes between 
Perth and  the eastern States, and between Queensland holiday destinations and 
the southern States. 
Patronage in Ansett’s and Australian’s premium (business and first) class cabins 
has not followed the trend observed for total patronage. The gradual decline in 
both first class and business class patronage in recent months has been due to 
the dilution of passengers to lower class fares (partly in response to service quality 
improvements such  as better seating), diversion of passengers from the two main 
incumbents to other airlines and the ongoing influence of the recession. 
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CHAPTER 6 IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON SERVICE 
QUALITY 
In evaluating the impact of deregulatiom, it is important to assess changes in 
service quality as well as fares. 
The term service quality can mean different things to different people. For some, 
in-flight comfort and service might be the most important consideration, while 
other consumers might put more emphasis on convenience of booking a flight at 
short notice or the quality of airport departure lounge facilities. 
The Bureau’s work on service quality indicators, of which this is a part, builds on 
the conceptual framework developed by Lancaster (1 966) for analysing service 
quality. This framework is  based on the characteristics of aproductwhich interact 
with the utility functions of consumers. Cbality is then determined by the quantity 
of the various characteristics present in the product. If there are increases in  the 
quantities of some characteristics (for example, frequency of flights) and 
decreases in  the quantities of others (for example, size of aircraft) information on 
consumers’ valuations of these Characteristics is required to determine whether 
the overall level of service quality has increased or decreased. 
In assessing the effect of deregulation on aviation service quality, it is therefore 
necessary to identify the characteristics to be measured, and then to assess the 
characteristics before and after deregulation. 
There are a large number of indicators which could be used to assess service 
quality in the aviation sector (BTCE, forthcoming). Studies of the effects of 
deregulation in overseas aviation markets provide guidance on which aspects of 
service quality to assess when evaluating the impact of Australian domestic 
deregulation. However, in this work the availability of data largely determined 
which indicators could be included in the analysis. 
This chapter provides quantitative data on pre-deregulation and 
post-deregulation comparisons of  flight frequency, load factors, the availability of 
non-stop services, on-time performance and choice of operator. We also discuss, 
in qualitative terms, passengers accessibility to RPT services, quality of in-cabin 
and on-ground services and safety. 
47 
BTCE Report 73 
FREQUENCY OF SERVICE 
One of the main benefits to consumers resulting from deregulation of the domestic 
aviation market in the United States has been an increase in  the frequency of 
flights between many locations (US DOT 1990). Increased frequency of service 
not only increases the consumers’ choice of departure times but increases the 
probability of being able to book a flight at  very short notice. 
To look at the effect of deregulation on this aspect of service, both  the number of 
scheduled and actual flights in a sample of markets were compared before and 
after deregulation. More specifically, to assess changes in  the actual number of 
flights, a sample of routes was chosen consisting of the top 40 city pair routes in 
terms of the numbers of passengers carried (traffic on board) by the domestic 
airlines during January 1990. As shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2, passengers carried 
on these routes comprise approximately 90 per cent of total passengers carried 
by the domestic airlines. 
In order to isolate, as far as possible, the effects of deregulation from the effects 
of the pilots’ dispute and seasonal influences, the main comparison is  between 
the flight frequencies in  the June quarters of 1990 and 1991. By April 1990, the 
effects of the pilots’ dispute had dissipated and passenger numbers had  returned 
to a ‘normal’ pre-deregulation level. The DoTC reported that: 
The rebuilding of the airlines  after the dispute  resulted  in  the  recovery of the industry 
to  the  extent  that by April  1990, traffic levels, boosted  by  Easter  holiday traffic, had 
recovered  to nearthe same level forthecorresponding month in 1989.  By  May  1990 
airline  capacity  levels  surpassed  the  available  seat  kilometres  achieved forthe same 
month in 1989. This followed the airlines’ return, during April, of the last of their 
leased aircraft which had  been used during  the pilots’ dispute  (DoTC 1991a). 
Flight frequencies were compared on all RPT services (both domestic and 
commuter) on  the  top 40 routes and  the results of this analysis are shown in table 
6.1. There was a 21 per cent increase in the number of RPT flights on  the  top 
40 routes from the June quarter in 1990 to the June quarter 1991. Over the same 
period the total number of passengers carried increased by 18 per cent. The 
seven routes which had the largest increases in flight frequencies were: 
Brisbane-Cairns (1 15 per cent); 
Brisbane-Mackay (1 07 per  cent); 
Geraldton-Perth (77 per  cent); 
. Perth-Sydney (71 per cent); 
Melbourne-Perth (58 per cent); 
Cairns-Sydney (58 per cent); and 
Brisbane-Rockhampton (52 per cent). 
Only seven of the top 40 routes incurred a decrease in flight frequency. 
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TABLE  6.1  COMPARISON OF REGULAR  PUBLIC  TRANSPORT  SERVICE  FREQUENCIESa 
ON  THE TOP  40  ROUTES  BETWEEN THE JUNE  QUARTER  1990  AND THE 
JUNE QUARTER  1991 
June  quarter 1 99 1 June  quarter 1990 
Trips  Pas engers  TripPas engers 
Melbourne-Sydney  6  468
Brisbane-Sydney  4  440 
Adelaide-Melbourne  2 339 
Canberra-Sydney  3  567 
Brisbane-Melbourne  1  784 
Coolangatta-Sydney  2 234 
Brisbane-Cairns  1  841
Melbourne-Perth  1  355 
Adelaide-Sydney  1  422 
Hobart-Melbourne  1  550 
Canberra-Melbourne  1 842 
Perth-Sydney  945 
Launceston-Melbourne  1  676 
Brisbane-Townsville 1 456 
Melbourne-Coolangatta  71  9
Adelaide-Perth  657 
Brisbane-Rockhampton 1 499 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs  377 
Cairns-Sydney  394 
Alice  Springs-Darwin  422
Alice  Springs-Sydney  378 
Karratha-Perth  485 
Devonport-Melbourne  629
Coffs Harbour-Sydney  560 
Brisbane-Mackay  742 
Brisbane-Darwin  251 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock  370 
Hamilton  Island-Sydney  269 
Kalgoorlie-Perth  652 
Cairns-Townsville  708 
Sydney-Wagga  526 
Alice  Springs-Cairns  309 
Mackay-Rockhampton  916 
Brisbane-Hamilton Island 223 
Geraldton-Perth  498 
Devonport-Sydney  182 
Perth-Port  Hedland  21  6 
Hobart-Sydney  21  4 
Broome-Perth  174 
Danuin-Kununurra  190 
Total  45  479 
729  284 
508  135 
223 192 
167  074 
165  834 
154  892 
132  994 
132  778 
127  222 
119  830 
115  828 
97  308 
83  058 
78  21  4 
56 050 
53  430 
51 447 
43  341 
43  31  3 
40  902 
30 245 
27  896 
23 500 
22  256 
21 503 
21 469 
21 127 
20 446 
20 106 
19  131 
19 070 
15  271 
13 856 
13 496 
12 798 
11  354 
10 861 
10  610 
10  113 
10  031 
3  479  265 
5 624 
3  755 
1  981 
2  773 
1 402 
1 955 
856 
858 
1 206 
1 284 
1 631 
554 
1 429 
1 027 
497 
632 
983 
368 
249 
399 
354 
477 
547 
578 
359 
234 
429 
239 
762 
1 290 
514 
357 
61  8 
247 
28 1 
244 
215 
195 
124 
190 
37 71  7 
603  795 
397 768 
203 788 
145  180 
132 364 
149 634 
70  729 
89  262 
121  547 
101 463 
111  842 
61 039 
70  741 
92 126 
48 534 
53  714 
38  691 
41 041 
21 330 
42  280 
24  764 
26  754 
21 984 
21 788 
21 714 
21 109 
13  833 
15  190 
22  332 
43  263 
17 983 
16  114 
13  983 
14 566 
10  041 
13  631 
12 276 
11 055 
6  932 
10  514 
2  956  694 
Percentage  change 
from  June  quarter 
1990 to 1991 
Tr@s Passengers 
- 
15 
18 
18 
29 
27 
14 
115 
58 
18 
21 
13 
71 
17 
42 
45 
4 
52 
2 
58 
6 
7 
2 
15 
107 
-3 
7 
-1 4 
13 
-1 4 
-45 
2 
-1 3 
48 
-1 0 
77 
-25 
0 
10 
40 
0 
21 
21 
28 
10 
15 
25 
4 
88 
49 
5 
18 
4 
59 
17 
-1 5 
15 
-1 
33 
6 
103 
-3 
22 
4 
7 
2 
-1 
2 
53 
35 
-1 0 
-56 
6 
-5 
-1 
-7 
27 
-1 7 
-1 2 
-4 
46 
-5 
18 
a.  Includes  both  domestic  and  commuter  airlines. 
Source DoTC aviation statistics database. 
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An additional issue regarding the impact of deregulation is the distribution of 
benefits across the trunk network. In particular, to what extent have benefits 
extended beyond the Brisbane-Sydney-Melbourne-Adelaide corridor? To 
address this issue, further analyses of flight frequencies based on actual trips 
were undertaken to separately identify the impact of deregulation on services: 
. between Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, and Adelaide; and 
on the remaining trunk routes which were included in the original top. 40 
routes. 
It was found that the average increase in flight frequencies (weighted by 
passenger numbers) was 18 per cent for the main intercapital routes and  even 
larger (27 per cent increase) on the other trunk routes in the top 40 set. A number 
of tourist destinations have clearly benefited from increased flight frequencies 
since deregulation. 
The data also reveal that the increase in flight frequency is not due solely to  the 
entry of Compass. A comparison of flight frequency data for the June quarters 
in 1990 and 1991 is presented in table 6.2. The domestic airlines (including 
Compass) increased flight frequency by 16 per cent on the top 40 routes, while 
passenger numbers rose by 17 per cent. When Compass figures are excluded 
from the totals, the increases are  11 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. Refer 
to appendix II for details. 
In order to determine whether the results of these analyses were influenced by 
changes to the size of aircraft operating on the top 40 routes, the average seating 
capacity of aircraft serving each city pair was calculated for the June quarters of 
1990 and 1991 (table 11.2). The results showed that the average aircraft size 
remained relatively constant over this period. The only three routes which 
experienced a decrease of 20 or more in average aircraft seating capacity were 
Brisbane-Townsville, Melbourne-Coolangatta and Cairns-Townsville. It is 
therefore concluded that the increased frequency of flights can not be  attributed 
to any great extent to substitution of smaller aircraft. 
To shed additional light on  the impact of deregulation on flight frequencies, the 
number of scheduled flights were compared in mid 1990 and mid 1991 (see 
appendix II, table 11.3). More specifically, a list of 82 routes was chosen on  the 
basis of what Australian Airlines defines as ‘Main Routes Services’. Flight data 
were tabulated based on timetables in effect in mid 1990 and mid 1991 for 
Australian, Ansett (including Air NSW/Ansett Express), Eastwest and Compass. 
Comparison of the average frequencies between the two dates indicated an 
increase of 18 per cent in the number of flights. It is noteworthy that this analysis, 
based  on a different sample, data source and time period, yields a result quite 
consistent with the findings based on actual trips. 
In summary, the available evidence clearly shows a significant increase in 
frequency of flights on the main domestic air routes in the post-deregulation 
period. It is also evident that the increase in flight frequency has been widespread 
and is not due only to  the entry of Compass Airlines to the industry. 
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TABLE 6.2 COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC  AIRLINE  SERVICE 
FREQUENCIES  ON  THE  TOP  40  ROUTES  BETWEEN 
THE  JUNE  QUARTER 1990 AND THE  JUNE  QUARTER 
1991 
(pefcenta,ge change) 
Trips Passengers 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Canberra-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Melbourne-Perth 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Perth-Sydney 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Brisbane-Rockharnpton 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Cairns-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Darwin 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Karratha-Perth 
Devonport-Melbourne 
Coffs  Harbour-Sydney 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Harnitton  Island-Sydney 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Cairns-Townsville 
Sydney-Wagga 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Mackay-Rockharnpton 
Brisbane-Hamilton  Island 
Geraldton-Perth 
Devonport-Sydney 
Hobart-Sydney 
Perth-Port Hedland 
Broome-Perth 
Darwin-Kununurra 
Average  (weighted) 
15 
18 
18 
28 
27 
14 
73 
58 
18 
21 
7 
71 
1 
6 
45 
4 
40 
2 
58 
6 
7 
2 
-1 3 
-3 
5 
7 
-1 4 
13 
-1 8 
-65 
2 
-1 3 
66 
-1 0 
24 
-25 
10 
0 
40 
0 
16 
21 
28 
10 
8 
25 
4 
88 
49 
5 
18 
2 
59 
9 
-1 6 
15 
-1 
32 
6 
103 
-3 
22 
4 
4 
2 
-9 
2 
53 
35 
-1 4 
-72 
6 
-5 
57 
-7 
-6 
-1 7 
-4 
-1 2 
46 
-5 
17 
Source DoTC aviation statistics database. 
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LOAD FACTORS 
Load factors reflect the interaction of demand and supply levels on any particular 
route. Low load factors improve service quality by: 
increasing the probability of being able to book a flight at very short notice; 
9 reducing crowding in-cabin and on-ground (baggage handling and check-in). 
and 
As indicated in table 6.3, average load factors for the domestic airlines on  the  top 
40 routes remained relatively constant to the  end of June 1991. Just over half  of 
the routes experienced a decrease in average load factors. Of the eleven 
intercapital city routes, only four experienced increases in average load factors 
and these were as low  as 1 or 2 per cent. The quarterly tables in appendix II also 
show that while load factors fluctuated from period to period, average load factors 
to the end of June 1991 decreased from their pre-deregulation levels. 
Data for the September 1991 quarter indicated that load factors rose substantially 
during the quarter, with load factors from the high 80s to the  mid 90s range in 
some instances. 
In summary, apart from short-term increases in load factors on some routes, there 
has not been significant change to this aspect of service quality since 
deregulation. 
NON-STOP  SERVICES 
Another measure of consumer convenience isthe availability of non-stop services 
on the main routes. Consumer benefits from non-stop service include: 
- shorter transit times; 
. reduced anxiety for passengers because of fewer landings and take-offs; 
- greater security for luggage; and 
. avoidance of the inconvenience of changing aircraft. 
One of the main disadvantages to consumers from deregulation in  the  United 
States was a decrease in non-stop services between many locations. This was 
due in large measure to the establishment of hub-and-spoke networks. 
In order to measure the impact of deregulation on the level of non-stop service 
in Australia, a comparison of the domestic airlines’ non-stop city pair network in 
June 1990 and June 1991 was undertaken. There was an increase from 128 to 
135  in  the number of non-stop passenger services, with 14 non-stop services 
being discontinued and 21  new non-stop services being added to the network. 
Many of the routes involved were very thin routes with only a few flights each 
month. Examples of more dense non-stop services which have begun  in recent 
months include Canberra-Brisbane and Perth-Brisbane. 
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TABLE 6.3 COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC  AIRLINE  AVERAGE 
LOAD  FACTORS OM THE  TOP 40 ROUTES BETWEEN 
THE  JUNE  QUARTER 1990 AND  THE  JUNE  QUARTER 
1991 
Percentage  change in 
average load factor 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Canberra-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Melbourne-Perth 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Perth-Sydney 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Brisbane-Rockharnpton 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Cairns-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Darwin 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Karratha-Perth 
Devonprt-Melbourne . 
Coffs Harbour-Sydney 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Hamilton  Island-Sydney 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Cairns-Townsville 
Sydney-Wagga 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Mackay-Rockhampton 
Brisbane-Hamilton  Island 
Geraldton-Perth 
Devonport-Sydney 
Hobart-Sydney 
Perth-Port  Hedland 
Broorne-Perth 
DarwiwKununurra 
Average  (weighted) 
Source DoTC aviation statistics database. 
1 
1 
-2 
-1 6 
2 
-9 
-3 
-9 
-4 
3 
-2 
-1 
8 
-6 
-3 
1 
11 
-8 
4 
-1 5 
19 
5 
-5 
-2 
-1 1 
-3 
15 
12 
4 
9 
11 
11 
-4 
10 
23 
-1 2 
-1 7 
-1 1 
3 
-3 
-1 
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In addition, a comparison of non-stop service frequency on the main routes served 
by domestic airlines was made using the published schedules in effect at mid 
1990 and mid 1991. This comparison shows an increase of 20 per cent in 
scheduled non-stop flights per week. 
Clearly, there is no evidence of a trend away from non-stop services as occurred 
in the United States after deregulation. 
ON-TIME  PERFORMANCE 
The need for punctuality varies between consumer groups, with the business 
consumer generally assigning a very high significance to this aspect of service. 
On-time performance can, however, also be critical for the leisure traveller who, 
for example, must make a connecting flight. Consumer inconvenience may also 
increase exponentially with delays of longer duration. A short delay can often be 
accommodated in the traveller’s schedule with little or no expense or 
inconvenience, while a longer delay may  have serious consequences. 
A deterioration in on-time performance has been another major negative effect 
of deregulation in the United States. The increase in United States flight delays 
appears to have occurred primarily because infrastructure capacity has not kept 
pace with the increase in demand following deregulation. In addition, the 
development by the airlines of hub-and-spoke networks has resulted in hub 
congestion, particularly at peak times, where flights from many origins arrive 
simultaneously and depart to many destinations a short time later. 
As discussed in chapter 5, there has been a significant increase in  demand for 
aviation services in Australia since deregulation. In order to assess whether this 
increase in  demand has resulted in a deterioration in on-time performance, the 
scheduled and actual arrival and departure times for domestic flights at the major 
airports were compared over the July 1990 to June 1991 period. 
The results of these comparisons are shown in figure 6.1 in terms of the 
percentage of domestic RPT aircraft arrivals and departures within 15-minutes 
of the scheduled times. Data are available from July 1990 to June 1991 inclusive 
for Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, but data for Adelaide and Perth are only 
available from January 1991. The 15-minute time period was chosen as, by 
international convention, flights arriving or departing within 15 minutes of the 
scheduled times are considered to be on-time. 
For Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane it can be seen that at the end of June 1991 
there had been no deterioration in on-time performance as a result of 
deregulation. Although the time series is too short to identify any seasonal 
patterns, a comparison of the beginning and end points on the graphs takes 
account of seasonal factors. For all three airports an improvement in on-time 
performance for both arrivals and departures over the period is evident, with 
arrival performance better than departure performance. 
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Sources BTCE (CAA flow management data base); Airline CRS systems. 
Figure 6.1 (cont.) Percentage of fllghts arriving and departing within 
15 minutes of the scheduled time' 
ACCESSIBILITY TO REGULAR PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICES 
Accessibility in  the context of quality of aviation services refers to the proximity 
of an airport to a particular community and to the provision of RPT services to 
and from that airport. It must be kept in mind that deregulation in Australia directly 
affected only the 18 designated trunk airports. 
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Studies have shown that RPT services to numerous small communities in the 
United States were discontinued following deregulation, although overall the 
frequency of service to small communities has increased. In the Australian 
context, discontinuing services to some! small communities would be particularly 
disruptive due to the long distances to the next closest airport. 
Since deregulation the balance between domestic and commuter airline services 
has changed on several routes in the network. However, there are only a very 
small number of routes on which there has been a complete shift from domestic 
to commuter services. There also appears to have been no shortage of operators 
willing to commence service on routes where an incumbent operator had 
discontinued the service. For example, within one week of Hazelton Airlines 
withdrawing services to 15 communitie!s, nine of the routes were being serviced 
by other operators. The remaining routes were also subsequently serviced by 
other operators. 
Only two airports in the total network have  lost all RPT services in  the past year. 
The available evidence therefore indicates that passengers’ accessability to RPT 
services has not been adversely affected by deregulation. 
CHOICE OF OPERATOR 
A greater number of operators on a route can affect consumer welfare through 
increased choice of: 
aircraft type (with consequent impact on transit times, in-cabin comfort and 
service, and safety levels); 
fare levels and conditions. 
departure times; and 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show that there has clearly been an increase in choice of 
operators on many major routes following deregulation. Routes with four airlines 
increased from zero to five, routes with three airlines increased from eleven to 
thirteen, and routes with only two operators decreased from nine to two. 
QUALITY OF IN-CABIN  AND  ON-GROUND  SERVICES 
As discussed in chapter 4, there have been major improvements in the quality of 
the services provided to air passengers since deregulation, both on the  ground 
and in the air. 
Improvements to ground-based servicels  start even before the customer walks in 
the door of the terminal. Ansett and Australian have introduced valet parking 
services to enable ease of access forthe self-drive customer. Once at the airport, 
the traveller receives the benefits of upgraded terminal facilities, particularly 
airline clubs. 
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Improvements to the services on  the aircraft have also been significant. Compass 
and Eastwest, with their one-class cabins, have chosen to provide generous 
space for passengers, while Australian and Ansett have chosen to provide 
additional space and upgraded service, primarily to premium passengers in 
business and (in Ansett’s case)  in first class. Compass has also introduced the 
first on-board movies for domestic services in Australia. 
In response to  the increased demand for discounted economy seating, both  the 
major airlines attempted to introduce a de facto four-class aircraft by 
distinguishing between full economy fare passengers and discount fare 
passengers. However, with the exception of the experiment by Ansett at 
providing lower grade in-flight refreshments to discount passengers, this has 
largely been achieved by providing extras such as newspapers and free drinks 
to full fare paying passengers, rather than cutting the quality of service to discount 
fare passengers. 
The overall impression is that under deregulation passengers are generally 
receiving either upgraded service or discount fares, or in some cases (such as 
Compass passengers with more leg room), both. There is  no evidence of  any 
real decline in these aspects of service quality to any market segment. 
SAFETY 
Aviation safety regulation in Australia was not directly affected by deregulation of 
the industry. Any possible impact would therefore have to be due to indirect 
effects such as increased congestion, entry of new operators, or financial 
pressure on operators to cut costs. 
Numbers of accidents and fatalities have generally been used  as indicators of 
safety levels in  the aviation industry. Data for the Australian RPT aviation sector 
indicate that the major domestic airlines have had no fatal accidents since 1968 
and only ten accidents in total in  the  ten years to December 1990, Supplementary 
and commuter airlines have had  two fatal accidents and thirty-two accidents in 
total over the past ten years. There have been no fatal accidents involving jet 
aircraft in  the RPT sector. 
Studies based  on several years experience in the deregulated environment in the 
United States have found no negative safety impacts associated with 
deregulation (Moses and Savage 1990). Although a quantitative assessment of 
safety is  beyond the scope of this study, safety regulatory authorities in Australia 
consider that deregulation will not adversely affect safety. Strict safety regulation 
and inspection procedures will be maintained. In addition, the ongoing process 
of upgrading aviation infrastructure, systems and operating procedures is 
designed to ensure that safety standards are not compromised. 
There is, therefore, no evidence to suggest that aviation safety in Australia has 
been, or will be adversely affected by deregulation. 
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DISCUSSION 
After one year of deregulation consumers have benefited from increased quality 
of service with respect to: 
frequency of flights; 
nonstop services; 
on-time performance; - choice of operators; and - in-cabin and on-ground service. 
There has been a small decrease in quality of service for some consumers due 
to higher load factors and reduced accessibility to RPT services on some 
non-trunk routes. 
The available evidence indicates that deregulation has not resulted in a 
deterioration in safety. It is therefore concluded that there has been an overall 
increase in consumer welfare due to improved quality of service during the first 
year of deregulation. This conclusion suggests that the aviation infrastructure in 
Australia has been able to cope with the increased demand resulting from 
deregulation. The Federal Airports Corporation has an ongoing capital works 
program, based on forecast demand levels, to ensure the adequacy of airport 
infrastructure. The Civil Aviation Authority is likewise revising its operations and 
procedures to ensure the adequacy of airways facilities to safely handle 
increasing demand. Aviation infrastructure should therefore facilitate improved 
levels of service quality in  the future. 
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OF  TRANSPORT 
DETERMINANTS OF MODAL CHOICE 
When deciding which mode to choose flora journey, the traveller has to consider 
a number of factors such as cost (direct and indirect), convenience, travel  time 
and the enjoyment of the trip itself. The values of these factors, and the 
consequent weight which each has upon the decision, varies over time with 
improvements in technology, changes in the market and changes in individual 
lifestyle. For example, improvements to  the road network have affected the cost, 
convenience and time considerations flor a journey by private car or coach. In 
the final choice, the traveller places a weighting, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, on each factor when making a modal decision. 
PRE-DEREGULATION 
Until  the late 1980s,  air travel and land tr,avel for intercity journeys within Australia 
were virtually separate markets, with little substitution between modes. Often 
those who travelled by land did so beca'use they could not afford to travel by air, 
or because they preferred to see the country through which they were travelling, 
or because they wanted to use their car at their destination. On the other hand, 
many who could afford to travel by air considered surface transport too slow and 
inconvenient. The main area of  competitlion  was between the long distance coach 
companies and the railways. 
Two events occurred in the latter part of the  1980s which caused many people 
to think more seriously about changing modes for long journeys. The first  was 
the Very Fast Train (VFT) proposal, which promoted fast rail transport as aviable 
alternative to air, coach and conventional rail travel in  the 
Sydney-Canberra-Melbourne corridor. The VFT proponents suggested that the 
train would provide a Sydney-Melbourne service in three hours for $130 
economy, Sydney-Canberrain one hourfor$60 and Canberra-Melbourne in  two 
hours for $100. With travel times and prices between those of air travel and 
existing surface travel, the VFT proposal, together with the concurrent 
alternatives proposed, such  as an upgrade of the existing Sydney-Melbourne rail 
service, raised the issue of a price-time offset for travel in that corridor. 
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The other significant event was the  pilots’ dispute, which had the effect of forcing 
many people who would not otherwise have done so, to travel by coach,  bus or 
car  on  long journeys. This was made more convenient by improvements  to  the 
road network in  the preceding years. However, with the possible  exception of 
the short Canberra-Sydney route, any transfer of travellers  from  air to rail, coach 
and car was not a long-term phenomenon. Table 7.1 illustrates  that,  by, 1990 
traffic on the  Sydney-Canberra route had not recovered from the  input of the 
pilots’ dispute in the same  way as  on  the Sydney-Melbourne and  the 
Canberra-Melbourne routes. 
TABLE  7.1  CHANGE IN AIR TRAVEL, 1987 TO  1990 
(indices of uplift-discharge patronage) 
Canberra-Sydney  Canberra-Melbourne Sydney-Melbourne 
1987 100 100  100 
1988  106 106  109 
1989  67 72 89 
1990 83 102 108 
Note 1987  is the base  year  for  the  indices. 
Source DoTC (1 991 a). 
TABLE 7.2 INTERMODAL COMPARISON: JANUARY AND MAY 1991 
(dollars perjourney) 
~~~~ ~ 
Car  Coach  Train  Air 
January 
Sydney-Melbourne 
Sydney-Brisbane 
Sydney-Perth 
May 
Sydney-Melbourne 
Sydney-Brisbane 
Sydney-Perth 
149  45 80 100 
140 65 85  100 
600 225 200  250 
149 52 85  85 
140 63 90  85 
600 225 200 1 65 
Notes a.  Car costs are based on lunning (variable) costs of a Nissan  Pulsar of  approx 14c per 
kilometre. 
pensioners  and  are  entitled to significant  concessions. 
b. Fares for rail and coach are full economy fare; however  many  rail  passengers  are 
c.  Air  fares  are  the  lowest  discount  air  fares  at  the time. 
Sources Ballantyne (1991); Roberts (1991); BTCE survey. 
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DEREGULATION OF THE  DOMESTIC  AVIATION  MARKET 
Since deregulation, however, there has been a dramatic effect on modal choice 
in some corridors. As extensive and de!ep discounting has become a feature of 
domestic aviation in 1991, and the traveller has been educated to shop around 
for cheap air fares, many people who would normally travel by land have chosen 
to travel by  air. 
This modal switch has probably not been uniform across the transport network: 
some long distance corridors with significant discounting appear to have 
experienced higher levels of substitutioln of air for land; shorter routes without 
much discounting appear to have been less affected. The improvements in 
service quality outlined in chapter6 will also have contributed to the modal switch. 
To help explain the impact of the air fare discounting on modal choice, the travel 
costs for air, car, coach and rail for the Sydney-Melbourne, Sydney-Brisbane 
and Sydney-Perth routes are compared in table 7.2 for the January and May 
discount wars. The air fares in this table were the lowest discount fares operating 
at the time compared to the prevailing standard coach and train fares. The table 
shows how air travel became increasinglly competitive with coach and train travel 
as the discounting continued .’ 
It can been seen from table 7.2 that by May the lowest air fare on the 
Sydney-Perth  route  was significantly less than either the coach or train fares. 
This had a major impact on patronage oln the Indian Pacific rail service, which in 
the winter months had load factors of as low  as 20 per cent, compared with the 
normal 80 per cent. Partly as a result of the increased competition from air travel, 
the Indian Pacific services were cut  from three to two services each direction per 
week in June and an additional five services were cancelled in August. 
The Australian Transport Advisory Council is expected to consider in March 1992 
a report which will examine the possibility of establishing a national rail passenger 
organisation. The Council will as a matter of priority consider the management 
and operation of the Indian Pacific service. 
The diversion of passengers from rail to air on the Sydney-Perth route partly 
explains the increase in air patronage on the route since deregulation. However, 
a large fraction of the increased patronage was due to market stimulation, that is 
passengers who otherwise would not  have made the journey. 
Discounting was  also introduced for both road and rail at the time of the June air 
fare discount campaign; Sydney-Brisbane cost $50 (later $48) by coach, $65 for 
rail and $88 by air. However, at the beginning of July, at the same time as 
1. It should be noted that a large proportion of train passengers travel on discounted tickets 
through  pension  concessions;  those  discounts  are,  however, not available to the general 
public. 
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Canberra was included in the discount war, the one-way economy rail fare 
Sydney-Canberra was increased from $30 to $31.70, with the maximum discount 
air fare costing $59 and coach $24. 
The Sydney-Melbourne lntercapital Daylight rail service was suspendedfrom  the 
end of August. It had been running at a load factor of around 40 per cent in May 
and June, despite a discounted fare of $50. Passenger numbers had  dropped 
by one third in the previous year. The overnight rail economy fare from Sydney 
to Melbourne was reduced from $85 (the maximum discount air fare) to $49 and 
capacity added to the overnight train to bring total capacity on  the route back to 
TABLE 7.3 COMPARISON OF STANDARD GREYHOUND/PIONEER COACH FARES WITH 
DISCOUNTED AIR FARES,  WINTER 1991 
Time 
(hours) 
Coach price 
Coach Air ($) 
Air price 
($1 
Maximum ~ Stiidaro' 
discount economy 
Syd-Me1 
Syd-Bne 
Adl-Me1 
Bne-Me1 
Cbr-Syd 
Mel-Per 
Cbr-Me1 
Bne-Cns 
Per-Syd 
Bne-Tsv 
Adl-Per 
Mel-Ool 
Bne-Mky 
Bne-Rok 
Cns-Syd 
001-Syd 
Adl-Syd 
Adl-ASP 
CfS-Syd 
Adl-DW 
Asp-Syd 
Asp-DW 
Bne-Drw 
Adl-Bne 
Syd-Wga 
AspCns 
MCy-Syd 
AsP-Ayq 
12 
16 
10 
14 
23 
19 
4 
46 
9 
24 
55 
19 
34 
25 
13 
9 
40 
18 
9 
43 
34 
17 
46 
29 
8 
33 
18 
5 
1 .oo 
1.15 
1.10 
1 .l5 
1.55 
1.50 
0.40 
4.00 
0.55 
2.05 
4.30 
1.40 
3.00 
2.00 
l .30 
1 .l0 
2.45 
2.00 
0.55 
3.20 
3.30 
2.00 
3.30 
2.15 
1.10 
2.20 
1.20 
0.50 
52 
63 
40 
63 
119 
125 
24 
205 
48 
139 
225 
120 
160 
119 
90 
63 
180 
153 
53 
265 
299 
153 
289 
1 73 
40 
225 
74 
63 
85  29 
88  237 
70  21 7 
80  224 
135  346 
110  31 2 
59  132 
150  18 
79  1 5 
125  354 
175  77 
139  313 
175 41 4 
140  338 
132  259 
103  201 
1 65 458
159  66 
96  167 
209  437 
249  508 
169  34 
269  556 
155  439 
142  142 
149  370 
125  245 
99 1 63 
Notes  a.  Routes  listed in uplift-discharge  ranking  for  air  travel, 1990. 
b. Times  and  prices  are for one-way  journeys. 
Sources  Pioneer/Greyhound  timetables  and  fare  schedule; BTCE survey of airlines. 
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around 84 per cent. A combination service, consisting of a V/Line train from 
Melbourne to Wodonga and a coach service from Wodonga to Sydney, was 
introduced to provide a daylight service for $49 economy class. Also at this time 
Greyhound overnight fares Sydney-Melbourne were reduced from $52 to $35, 
Melbourne-Canberra and Melbourne--Adelaide overnight bus fares were also 
reduced to $35, and Sydney-Adelaide fares were reduced to $89, 
A comparison between the price and travel time for coach and air journeys on a 
wide range routes is given in table 7.3. This comparison makes it clear why there 
is little doubt that there has been, and will probably continue to be, substantial 
diversion from bus to air in the face of continued air fare wars. Of the 30 top 
routes surveyed, 16 had discounted airiiares close to or less than the coach fares. 
Coach travel will probably remain competitive on short, dense routes such as 
Sydney-Canberradue to the shortertravelling time, and on long thin routes such 
as Perth-Karratha, where a lack of heavy discounting has allowed coach travel 
to retain a significant price differential. However, on the long, dense routes such 
as Melbourne-Brisbane,  Melbourne-Perth and Sydney-Cairns, where a 
concentrated discounting campaign hias resulted in air fares near to or below 
coach fares, coach travel may lose heavily to air travel. 
Interestingly, at least one bus companly claimed that deregulation had actually 
helped them, as they sold more tickets for intermediate journeys, which provided 
a higher return per service (Boalch 1991). 
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DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR 
Based on the first year’s evidence, deregulation of domestic aviation in Australia 
has, from the consumers’ perspective, been very successful. Reliance on market 
forces and competition, as opposed to regulation, has so far provided clear 
benefits to consumers. 
An important goal of deregulation was increased competition. It appears that the 
mechanisms put in place to enhance competition have been largely successful. 
In particular, the emergence of  Cornpalss, with a national market share of more 
than 10 per cent in its first year of operation, is a significant event. A new entrant, 
almost by necessity, must stimulate competition to gain such a strong foothold in 
the market place. As such, the emergence of Compass illustrates that although 
some barriers to entry may be present in Australia’s domestic airline industry, 
such barriers are  not impregnable. Also, the two incumbents are now competing 
with each other to a great degree, much more so now than under regulation. 
Thus, the goal of providing greater cornpetition appears to have been achieved. 
This enhanced competition has provided consumers with strong benefits in the 
first year of deregulation. Average falres are down significantly, with heavily 
discounted fares now the norm for customers planning travel in advance. Flight 
frequency has also increased substantially in the first year of deregulation, with 
data on actual trips showing a 21 per cent increase from the second quarter 1990 
to the second quarter 1991. 
Although it is not  at his point possible to quantify the change in consumersurplus 
from deregulation, it is clear that consumer surplus has increased. Previous 
studies of the impact of deregulation on consumer surplus in other countries have 
shown that consumer surplus depends primarily on the level of fares, the average 
time between flights (flight frequency), and the average duration of flights. 
Australia’s domestic deregulation has cllearly produced lower fares and shorter 
average times between flights. Given that on balance there appears to be more 
non-stop service in the wake of deregulation, the average duration of flights has 
arguably declined as well. Thus, consumer surplus has unambiguously 
improved. 
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It is also notable that consumers have enjoyed these benefits with no serious 
negative concomitants, unlike their United Statess counterparts. While record 
levels of patronage have been recorded in the first year of deregulation, 
congestion at Australian airports has not been a serious problem. On-time 
performance for aircraft arrivals has been good and shows no evidence of 
deterioration with deregulation. Service to customers in-cabin and on the  ground 
appears to be improving, as airlines intensify their efforts to attract customers. 
Perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence of any deterioration in safety. 
It is also noteworthy that the benefits of deregulation have extended to a broad 
range of markets. In particular, reduced fares and improved service frequency 
have extended well beyond the Adelaide-Melbourne-Sydney-Brisbane corridor. 
Destinations such as Perth and Cairns have been among the greatest 
beneficiaries; indeed, the Northern Queensland tourism industry has enjoyed a 
dramatic turnaround, largely on the coat-tails of discount fares. While consumer 
benefits from discounted fares and improved frequencies have often been 
greatest ,in the markets where Compass has entered, significant benefits have 
extended to a broad range of markets. For example, travellers in cities such as 
Darwin and Hobart have also been clear beneficiaries from deregulation. 
From the carriers’ perspective, the first year of deregulation has corresponded 
with disappointing financial performance. According to acornpass press release, 
Compass reported an operating loss of $16.5 million for the year ended June 30 
1991. For  the same year, Australian announced an operating pre-tax profit of 
$6.4 million, leaving aside abnormal items. This was obtained on revenue of 
$1 585 billion, an increase of  33.8 per cent on the previous year. However, the 
pre-tax profit for the first six months of the financial year was $18.82 million, 
showing a significant decline into losses for the first six months of 1991. While 
complete data for the Ansett family are not available at this time, preliminary 
indications are of combined losses for the group. 
l 
The AN2 McCaughan Aviation Industry Monitor of October 1991 estimated that 
the industry could be losing up to $200 million per year and that this  trend  could 
continue for some time. 
There have been bright spots as well from the carriers’ perspective. There  is 
clearly improved production efficiency in  the industry with, on average, lower cost 
of providing service. This is due to Compass’s low cost entry in conjunction with 
progress by incumbents in reducing costs. In addition, there are ambitious plans 
by Ansett and Australian to significantly cut costs in  the future. 
Press reports indicate that the TNT/News Corporation-owned airlines have cut 
approximately 500 jobs so far in 1991 and rationalised operations generally in 
the areas of administration and maintenance, with Ansett carrying out some of 
these functions for Ansett Express, Ansett WA and Eastwest. As a result the 
Ansett WA maintenance facility in Perth and  the Eastwest facility at Tamworth 
have both been closed (Moffet 1991 a). Press reports also indicate that Australian 
Airlines has a general target of $100 million in cost cutting, through negotiating 
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new work practices and revising operations (Moffet 1991 b). It cut its staff levels 
by about 1000 in the six months to October 1991, and claimed in early October 
that its profitability in the previous month was due to the impact of cost cutting 
measures taken earlier in the year (Lecky 1991). 
This activity provides evidence of  how market forces facilitate efficient resource 
allocation, with new  low cost entry and heightened competition forcing firms  to 
reduce costs. Moreover, despite a severe recession, the airlines have achieved 
record levels of patronage and have maintained high load factors despite the 
recession and the addition of substantial new capacity. 
Although a quantification of economic effects of domestic deregulation involving 
counterfactual estimates of both consumer and producer surplus is beyond the 
scope of this paper, the evidence strongly suggests that economic welfare has 
unambiguously improved so far (refer appendix Ill).’ 
LOOKING TO THE  FUTURE 
What will the future hold for the Austrialian domestic aviation industry? It is 
predicted that benefits enjoyed by consumers in the first year will  be sustained 
over time. This prediction is  in contrast to a number of recent media reports which 
have argued that fare discounting has caused the airlines to  lose money. Thus, 
the argument goes, it is inevitable ithat discounting and fares return to 
pre-deregulation levels. This is a specious argument as it neglects two important 
factors, namely the recessionary impact on business travel and the potential for 
airlines to further rationalise costs. 
It is quite clear that the recession has had a dramatic impact on business travel. 
This loss of high yield patronage has had serious adverse financial consequences 
for the airlines. The recession, rather than fare discounting under deregulation, 
should be seen as the major cause of weak airline financial performance in  the 
past year. 
As discussed above, airlines have proceeded with a modicum of cost 
rationalisation. However, the analysis indicates that there is considerable scope 
for further cost rationalisation in Australian domestic aviation. Continued 
competition under deregulation, in coinjunction  with disappointing financial 
performance, will force airlines to proceled with efforts to cut costs. Thus, the 
most likely scenario is that as the economy improves and airlines continue with 
their efforts to cut costs, industry profits will greatly improve while fare discounting 
will persist. 
1. A counterfactual  methodology for assessing  the  economic  effects of deregulation  has been 
laid out by  Morrison & Winston (1986) in theilr analysis of United  States  airline  deregulation. 
However, applying this methodology in the Australian context is hampered by severe 
problems  in  gaining  access to necessary  data  such  as  carrier costs and  profits  as well as 
average  yields  across  the  system  both  prior t  and since  deregulation. 
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The analysis suggests that the future direction of competition and market 
performance will be strongly influenced by future industry structure. Given the 
existence of a competitive environment, it appears likely that discounting will 
continue for the foreseeable future. Although the intensity of competition may 
moderate somewhat with an upturn of the economy and market growth to reduce 
excess capacity, it is anticipated that fare discounting and levels will resemble 
more closely the experience in the first year of deregulation than  the 
pre-deregulation experience. Indeed, competition could be further enhanced by 
the introduction of services by  new entrants such as AAA Airlines or 
Transcontinental. 
However, achange in the competitive environment could have a significant effect 
on the level of discounting. If one airline ceases to operate or is merged with 
another and there is no new entry, competition will be reduced.2 Given that the 
airlines have different competitive characteristics, the effect upon the market of 
the exit of a carrier would depend upon which airline disappeared and whether 
new entry occurred concurrently. If a new entrant no longer exists independently 
in the market, there could be a serious deterioration in the level of competition. 
The critical issue is the height of industry entry and operational barriers, which 
determine whether existing and potential new entrants can survive and thrive. At 
present, the entry barriers do not appear to be high enough to impede a 
competitive market structure. 
The competitive environment which has existed since deregulation has resulted 
in significant changes to the structure of the industry. A new entrant has shown 
that, although some barriers to entry exist, these can be overcome. Moreover, 
the presence of a new operator, with a different cost structure, operating practices 
and marketing techniques, has greatly increased the rivalry between all domestic 
carriers. 
It is likely that these structural and behavioural changes are here to stay. In  the 
coming years the ownership of the airlines may change, and the aircraft may have 
to be repainted in different colours, but the industry is now operating in a 
fundamentally different way. So far it appears that the Government’s 
deregulation objectives are being met. 
2. There  could be a role  for  the  Trade  Practices  Commission  in  cases  where  airline  mergers or 
acquisitions  infringe upon the  Trade  Practlces Act. 
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COMPETITION 
FARE DISCOUNTING 
Lead-up  to deregulation 
In early 1990, as the airlines began to recover from the pilots’ dispute and 
prepared for deregulation, the number and types of fare discounts began to 
increase. Typical of this was the introduction by both Australian and Ansett of a 
40 per cent discount for travellers ovelr 60 years old. This discount introduced a 
new dimension in discounting, with a defined end to the period of availability, in 
this case 30 October, as well as a targeted market. 
In late August a more intense discounting campaign began, with Australian, then 
Ansett, announcing a 50 per cent discount for off-peak return travel. Initially 
confined to the Sydney-Melbourne route, it was later expanded to all major cities. 
Conditions limited travel to defined off-peak flights on Tuesdays, Wednesdays 
and Thursdays, with one weekend away and tickets booked seven days in 
advance. 
On 6 September Australian also introduced a 50 per cent discount on no-frills 
overnight flights from early October to mid December, between Sydney or 
Melbourne and the Gold Coast and from Melbourne to Cairns, with  one flight on 
each route per week. Seven days advance booking was required with a stopover 
of between seven and fourteen days. This initiative introduced some variation in 
discounting strategies by the two airlines. Eastwest on 9 September announced 
a 50 per cent discount on its routes, with a thirty day advance purchase and three 
nights minimum stay. 
On 17 September, Ansett introduced a 50 per cent discount on Perth to 
Melbourne or Sydney night flights from 1 October with no conditions on booking 
or length of stay, perhaps in response to Compass’s proposals to offer such a 
discount. On 21 September, Australuan introduced discounts averaging 55 per 
cent from 1 November to 16 March for late night and overnight flights between 
major eastern cities. Conditions inclulded  seven day advance booking. Next day 
Ansett introduced a 40 per cent discolunt on the Sydney to Melbourne return fare 
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31 July. Ansett matched the discounts by Australian, and Compass cut them by 
an additional $1 0, which was subsequently matched by Ansett and Australian. 
This reduced the Adelaide-Melbourne fare to $75 one way. 
On 19 July, Compass offered discount ‘Freedom Fares’ useable by business 
travellers, with tickets on sale until 14 August and useable anytime until 30 June 
1992, without advance specification of day or time of travel. The 
Sydney-Melbourne fare was set at $95. On  23 July, Compass provided special 
discounts to Perth in  the last week of their discount campaign. These included 
Sydney-Perth  $1 70 and Melbourne-Perth $1 45. 
Also on 24 July Australian discounted fares to Perth, from Melbourne at $300 
return and from Sydney at $350, with tickets on sale to 31 July and useable to 30 
April 1992. On the same day Compass discounted fares to Perth by a further $5, 
with tickets on sale to 31 July. This reduced Sydney-Perth fares to $160 and 
Melbourne-Perth fares to $140. Compass also announced a discounted 
Melbourne-Perth return fare of $250 for sale and use during August 1991. 
On 29 July, Ansett extended its discount campaign on 21 2 routes to 14 August, 
with the time limit for use remaining 31 March 1992. It also announced an August 
discount for Perth-Melbourne one way  of $125. Compass and Australian also 
announced an extension of the booking period  to 14 August. 
On 5 August, Australian offered a new, shallower discount schedule on sale until 
31 October and useable to 30 June 1992. This new discount campaign was 
aimed at the Compass Freedom Fares, with a similar price list; however, although 
available for a longer period and with bookings able to be amended, availability 
of seats was limited unlike the Compass fare. 
On  15August, immediately afterthe  end of the earlier, deeper discount campaign, 
Ansett announced its new discounts, which matched the new Australian fare 
schedule. It also announced that its eastern regional airline partners would be 
offering discounts in conjunction with Ansett’s trans-continental discounts. 
However, on  the same day Australian announced that it would be extending the 
earlier campaign to the  end of August, effectively undercutting Ansett. 
Compass announced on the following day’that it would also extend the deeper 
discounting until the  end of August, with a further $5 reduction (to $70) for a 
Melbourne-Adelaide ticket until the  end of November. Conditions included no 
refunds and payment within 72 hours of booking, but without restriction on 
availability. Compass also introduced a Business Pass to replace the Freedom 
Fares, available until 12 September for travel until 30 June 1992, with payment 
within 72 hours, non-refundable but open-dated, in a company name and 
transferable to other flights. However fares were more expensive than the 
Freedom Fares, with Sydney-Melbourne at $1 25 rather than $95, although they 
were cheaper than Ansett and Australian’s standard economy fares at $229. 
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On 17 August, Ansett also extended thse deeper discounts until 31 August. On 
the same day Eastwest reintroduced its $80 Sydney - Gold Coast fare, payable 
within 72 hours of booking and non-refundable, and available for purchase until 
31 August for travel until 30 April 1992. Around this time Australian announced 
a special $198 Sydney-Perth return fare with the outward journey to take place 
on 22 August at 9 pm and the return flight to be booked simultaneously. 
On 22 August, Ansett announced a ‘~Bizsaver Fare’, with similar fares and 
conditions to the Compass Business Pass. 
On 25 August both Ansett and Australian announced the introduction of frequent 
flier programs, each with an entrance fee. Compass did not respond immediately 
but advertised that its lower cost fares glave much better value than the rewards 
for the frequent flier schemes. But on 4 September it responded with an offer of 
two free flights for every one purchased and used prior to 21 September 1991, 
with the free tickets useable within 12 mlonths but bookable only within 24 hours 
of flying. This gave equivalent single ,fares of $62 Sydney-Melbourne, $124 
Sydney-Brisbane and $138 Sydney-Perth. And on 5 September, 
acknowledging that the previous offer was a gimmick, Compass introduced sales 
of books of between five and fifty tickets, at discounts of between 25  and 40 per 
cent depending on the number of tickets,, available indefinitely. 
On 11 September, Australian introduced a ‘Money Saver’ticket equivalent to the 
Ansett Bizsaver and the Compass Business Pass which were due to expire the 
following day, available for purchase untlil  31 March 1992. The ticket was  aimed 
to counter the Compass bulk buy ticket packs and was cheaper than even the 
large packs, although with availability restrictions unlike Compass. 
Ansett in turn responded to Australian’s matching deal by making a two for the 
price of one offer (to be used prior to 31  IOctober 1991) plus free membership of 
the Frequent Flier Club for anyone who joined the Ansett Golden Wings Club  in 
September. And Compass responded to Australian’s Money Saver ticket with 
the reintroduction on 16 September of the Compass Freedom Fares, cheaper 
than the Money Saver ticket, but only available for one week for use until 30 June 
1992. 
Meanwhile on 17 September, Bryan Grey in a speech to the Bureau of Industry 
Economics and Business Review Weekly Manufacturing Outlook Conference 
suggested that airfares would rise in Octlober  as demand picks up for the  period 
to January 1992 and the airlines seek to ilmprove their profitability (Power 1991). 
However on 3 October Ansett and Australian commenced a further round of 
reductions with discounts available for sale until 20 October and for travel from 
20 October until 16 November, with Sydney-Melbourne costing $89. This was 
followed by Compass dropping its fares still further, with Sydney-Melbourne 
coming down to $79, although Compass’s fares were only on sale until 11 October 
but available for use until the end of summer. Australian and Ansett matched the 
fares, with tickets still available until 20 October and useable until 30 June 1992. 
Eastwest also joined the discounting with its  cheap fares available for sale until 
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20 October for use until 16 November. This campaign was not extended, 
although on 29 October Compass introduced a two-for-one offer available for use 
until 5 December. On 31 October Ansett introduced an anniversary discount 
schedule available between 11 November and 15 December, with 
Sydney-Melbourne down to $89 from the existing discount rate of $95. At the 
same time Compass reintroduced its Freedom Fares, for sale for eight days but 
open dated and useable for twelve months, with Sydney-Melbourne at $127. 
Australian introduced a discount schedule similar to Ansett, also available until 
15 December. 
COMPETITION FOR SERVICE QUALITY 
In  the period leading up  to deregulation the airlines probably saw much of their 
future prosperity lying in the first class and business class markets. In that time 
both Australian and Ansett upgraded their first class, business class and Flight 
DecWGolden Wing facilities, and introduced a luggage delivery service to 
selected hotels. Ansett also introduced currency exchange facilities, self-write 
tickets for passengers operating an account with the airline and  aservice allowing 
passengers to complete hotel registration at the airport. Australian built a 
conference centre in its facilities in Melbourne to attract interstate business 
conferences, and introduced an arrangement with selected hotels allowing first 
and business class passengers to be upgraded to better rooms. Ansett sold a 
protective carry case for portable computers for $250, which could  then  be  carried 
as checked baggage with no excess baggage charge. Valet parking was 
introduced by both airlines early in 1991. 
The newcomer Compass provided economy-only services but with a 86 cm pitch, 
the same as provided by Australian and Ansett in business class. This generosity 
was initially countered by reduced elbow room arising from its nine-abreast 
seating, but this was changed to eight-abreast on all aircraft in mid-1991. It also 
was  the first airline to introduce in-flight videos. Some commentators claimed 
that Compass was disadvantaged by being unable to provide premium departure 
lounges, although this was disputed by Compass management. 
Eastwest operates its BAe 146s with five-across seating rather than six-across, 
allowing the widest economy seats in Australia. Both Eastwest and Compass had 
a significant lead over the other airlines in terms of passenger comfort in economy 
class. 
In an attempt to corner some of the business market, Compass, immediately prior 
to commencing operations in December 1990, introduced a quasi business class 
whereby passengers who paid a fare equivalent to the business class fare on  the 
other airlines would be seated at the front of the aircraft and would be given an 
empty seat next to them. They would be given the same standard of catering as 
other passengers and would not have access to otherfacilities. In February 1991, 
Compass also introduced a charge card for frequent travellers, which provided 
some priority services, increased carry-on luggage allowance and some 
discounts for accommodation and car hire. 
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Also in mid February, Australian introduced two-by-two seating in business class 
using existing seating at about 86 cm pitch with the middle seat  left vacant. At 
the same time, Ansett initiated a major step forward in the business class battle, 
by widening the gap between business and economy through the introduction of 
an upgraded business class which included wider first class seating with a 
minimum 91 cm pitch in a two-by-two arrangement and better service at no extra 
charge. In June first class received even better seating and service in a fixed 
size cabin but with fewer first class seats to make room for more business class 
or economy seating. For example, the B767s would have eighteen first class and 
sixteen business class seats. 
In  mid May Ansett and Australian effectively introduced a four class service when 
they sought to differentiate between full fare paying economy passengers and 
passengers paying for discounted tickets. This was achieved by providing extra 
services for full fare paying passengers, such as drinks and newspapers and, on 
Ansett’s part, by downgrading catering for discount fare passengers. 
PRICE  VERSUS  QUALITY FOR THE BUSINESS MARKET 
Price competition for the business marlket commenced in February 1991 when 
Compass launched a national advertising campaign aimed at the business 
market. Recognising the importance of the frequent-flying business market, 
Compass promoted guaranteed 20 per cent savings on all flights together with a 
free night’s accommodation in February for holders of the Compass Class card.’ 
It believed that there were enough cost conscious business travellers to trigger 
interest similar to that in the leisure market, particularly as Compass’s 
configuration of its aircraft would give its passengers business class legroom. 
At the same time Compass introduced a scheme in which companies paid  the 
normal Ansett or Australian economy fare for their employees and the employees 
were granted the difference between that fare and the lower Compass fare toward 
future travel. 
In mid February Compass went further, advertising a two Compass seat offer for 
one Ansett full economy fare, to memblers of Ansett’s Golden Wing Club. The 
offer was open for one month. 
In May Australian announced a give-away promotion of overseas holidays and 
tickets to majorevents, open to all passelngers, while Ansettresponded with 1000 
seven-night holidays in the Whitsundaly Islands, open to all full fare paying 
passengers. Both airlines also provided discounted combined business class 
travel/accommodation packages in May. 
1. There is a 20 per cent difference between Compass’s full fare and the other airlines’ full 
econornyfares. 
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On  19 July, Compass extended its current discounting campaign specifically to 
cover business travellers when it offered discount Freedom Fares. These tickets 
were on sale until 14 August and useable anytime until 30 June 1992, without 
advance specification of  day  or time of travel. The Sydney-Melbourne fare was 
set at $95, slightly higher than the maximum discount fare of the time but 
significantly less than Ansett’s and Australian’s standard economy fare of $229. 
On 5 August, Australian offered a new discount schedule on sale until 31 October 
and useable to 30 June 1992. This new discount campaign was aimed at the 
Compass Freedom Fares, with a similar price list; however, although available 
for a longer period and with bookings able to be amended, availability of seats 
was limited unlike the Compass fare. 
Compass also introduced a Business Pass to replace the Freedom Fares, 
available until 12 September for travel until 30 June 1992, with payment within 
72 hours, non-refundable but open-dated, in a company name and transferable 
to other flights. However fares were more expensive than the Freedom Fares, 
with Sydney-Melbourne at $125 rather than $95. 
On 22 August, Ansett announced a Bizsaver Fare, with similar fares and 
conditions to  the Compass Business Pass. It also provided a give-away 
promotion of a Mercedes Benz for first class passengers and Golden Wing Club 
Members only. 
On 25 August, both Ansett and Australian announced the introduction of frequent 
flier programs aimed at the business traveller. Each scheme had  an entrance fee 
and a limitation of one yearforcarryoverof  creditsto reduce the level of contingent 
liability. Compass did not respond immediately, stating that its lower fares gave 
much better value than the frequent flier schemes. However, on 5 September 
Compass introduced sales of books of between five and fifty tickets at discounts 
of between 25 and 40 per cent depending on the number of tickets, available 
indefinitely. 
On 11 September, Australian introduced a Money Saver ticket equivalent to the 
Ansett Bizsaver and the Compass Business Pass, available for purchase until 31 
March 1992. The ticket was aimed to counter the Compass bulk buy ticket packs 
and was cheaper than even the large packs, although with availability restrictions 
unlike Compass. On the same day it also responded to Ansett by introducing a 
double points bonus for its frequent flier club for the rest of the month. Ansett 
had a few days earlier introduced a bonus of 1500 kilometres of free air travel for 
any full fare return journey taken on any Ansett service between 8 September 
and 30 September, in an effort to entice frequent fliers to sign up for  its scheme. 
Ansett in turn responded to Australian’s matching deal  by making a two for the 
price of one offer (to be used prior to 31 October 1991) plus free membership of 
the frequent flier club for anyone who joined the Ansett Golden Wing Club in 
September. Ansett also extended coverage of its frequent flier scheme to include 
all of its affiliate airlines, including Eastwest. And Compass responded to 
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Australian’s Money Saver ticket with the reintroduction on 16 September of the 
Compass Freedom Fares, cheaperthan the Moneysaverticket, but only available 
for one week for use until 30 June 1992. 
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DOMESTIC  AIRLINES 
This appendix presents data on flight frequencies, passenger numbers, load 
factors and size of aircraft for the major city pair routes in Australia. The data 
series covers periods before and after deregulation so that the reader can gauge 
the impact of deregulation primarily on the flight frequency aspect of service 
quality. 
Table 11.1 provides details of the number of trips, passengers and average load 
factors achieved by the domestic airlines on the top 40 routes from the March 
quarter 1990 to the June quarter 19911. The data were obtained from the 
Department of Transport and Communications' aviation statistics data base. The 
top 40 routes were defined in terms of numbers of passengers (traffic on board) 
travelling between the selected city pairs during January 1990. The DoTC traffic 
on board data for the domestic airlines represent passengers travelling non-stop 
between the designated centres regardless of origin and destination. Passengers 
on multi-stage journeys (for example Sydney-Melbourne-Adelaide-Perth) are 
thus recorded on each stage of the  total journey. 
Table 11.2 shows the average size of aircraft used on the top 40 routes during the 
June quarter 1990 and the June quarter '1 991. Average aircraft size was derived 
by calculating the average passenger numbers per trip from the figures in table 
11.1 and factoring up by the average load factor on each route. The results thus 
provide an estimate of the average seating capacity of all of the aircraft operated 
by domestic airlines on the routes during the June quarters in 1990 and 1991. 
Table 11.3 shows the number of schedulled flights per week as at mid 1990 and 
mid 1991 on 82 routes appearing in the published schedules of the domestic 
airlines. 
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TABLE 11.1 SERVICE  FREQUENCY  ON  TOP 40 ROUTESa  SERVED  BY  DOMESTIC 
AIRLINES,  MARCH  QUARTER 1990 TO  JUNE  QUARTER 1991 
~~ 
March quarter 7990 
Average 
Trips  Passengers load factor 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Melbourne-Perth 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Perth-Sydney 
Canberra-Sydney 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Alice  Springs-Darwin 
Brisbane-Rockhampton 
Karratha-Perth 
Hobart-Sydney 
Devonport-Melbourne 
Hamilton  Island-Sydney 
Coffs  Harbour-Sydney 
Cairns-Townsville 
Brisbane-Hamilton  Island 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Darwin-Kununurra 
Perth-Port  Hedland 
Cairns-Sydney 
Devonport-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Geraldton-Perth 
Sydney-Wagga 
Mackay-Rockhampton 
Broome-Perth 
Total  March  quarter 1990 
5 216 
3 258 
1816 
1 556 
1 200 
1 207 
1 203 
804 
1319 
766 
598 
1 069 
1119 
61 9 
471 
482 
330 
347 
340 
408 
260 
361 
191 
472 
321 
174 
186 
368 
1 74 
263 
171 
180 
196 
93 
187 
304 
206 
352 
173 
114 
28  874 
602  224 
383  059 
186  027 
l38  617 
132  026 
113  486 
122  871 
100  686 
86  475 
71  361 
69  549 
94 659 
93  085 
70  296 
48  465 
45  564 
34  349 
30  195 
25  245 
22  750 
17  740 
21 164 
l8  705 
19  318 
24  61 9 
13  420 
12  327 
16  896 
15  596 
l6  719 
12  912 
9 877 
10 573 
7 661 
1 1  836 
14  194 
8 829 
12  712 
7 366 
6 015 
2 749  468 
67.1 
74.3 
74.1 
81 .O 
73.1 
71.5 
78.9 
77.8 
75.3 
70.5 
68.8 
77.1 
69.3 
73.1 
76.8 
75.3 
76.3 
62.4 
68.2 
75.4 
75.2 
83.4 
78.9 
72.9 
43.2 
73.6 
53.0 
61.2 
65.6 
65.3 
64.8 
71.8 
73.7 
65.5 
89.5 
71.2 
63.3 
71 .O 
55.6 
72.3 
70.9 
82 
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TABLE 11.1 (Cont.)  SERVICE  FREQUENCY ON TOP 40 ROUTESa  SERVED  BY  DOMESTIC 
AIRLINES, MARCH QUARTER 199QTO JUNE QUARTER 1991 
June  quarter 1990 
Average 
Trips Passengers load factor 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Melbourne-Perth 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Perth-Sydney 
Canberra-Sydney 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Alice  Springs-Darwin 
Brisbane-Rockhampton 
Karratha-Perth 
Hobart-Sydney 
Devonport-Melbourne 
Hamilton  Island-Sydney 
CoffsHarbour-Sydney 
Cairns-Townsville 
Brisbane-Hamilton  Island 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Darwin-Kununurra 
Perth-Port Hedland 
Cairns-Sydney 
Devonport-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Geraldton-Perth 
Sydney-Wagga 
Mackay-Rockhampton 
Broome-Perth 
Total  June  quarter  1990 
5  624 
3  755 
1 981 
1 955 
1 402 
1 284 
1 206 
858 
1 429 
856 
554 
2 043 
1 631 
1 027 
497 
63 2 
368 
399 
523 
477 
195 
41 5 
239 
578 
462 
247 
234 
41 3 
359 
357 
354 
190 
215 
249 
244 
429 
281 
51  4 
223 
1 24 
34 823 
603  795 
397  768 
203  788 
149 634 
132  364 
101  463 
121  547 
89  262 
70 741 
70  729 
61 039 
133  184 
111  842 
92  126 
48 534 
53  71  4 
41 041 
42  280 
33  635 
26 754 
11 055 
20 300 
15  190 
21  788 
31  368 
14 566 
21 109 
18  918 
21 714 
16  114 
24  764 
10 514 
12 276 
21 330 
13  631 
13 833 
10  041 
17 983 
8 068 
6  932 
2  91  6  734 
65.4 
68.2 
77.8 
72.7 
72.0 
68.0 
77.6 
73.0 
65.2 
73.3 
63.8 
69.2 
62.7 
71 .O 
70.8 
65.3 
83.1 
79.0 
63.6 
77.2 
69.6 
69.1 
59.9 
64.9 
47.8 
60.1 
74.9 
63.1 
68.1 
50.6 
61.9 
73.7 
79.3 
76.2 
79.6 
52.2 
49.9 
70.0 
40.6 
77.6 
67.7 
83 
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TABLE 11.1 (Cont.)  SERVICE  FREQUENCY  ON  TOP 40 ROUTESa  SERVED  BY  DOMESTIC 
AIRLINES,  MARCH  QUARTER 1990 TO JUNE QUARTER 1991 
September  quarter 7990 
Average 
Trips Passengers  load factor 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Melbourne-Perth 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Perth-Sydney 
Canberra-Sydney 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Alice Springs-Damin 
Brisbane-Rockhampton 
Karratha-Perth 
Hobart-Sydney 
Devonport-Melbourne 
Hamilton Island-Sydney 
Coffs  Harbour-Sydney 
Cairns-Townsville 
Brisbane-Hamilton Island 
Brisbane-Damin 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Darwin-Kununurra 
Perth-Port  Hedland 
Cairns-Sydney 
Devonport-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Geraldton-Perth 
Sydney-Wagga 
Mackay-Rockhampton 
Broome-Perth 
Total September  quarter 1990 
5 404 
3 912 
2 165 
1 976 
1 604 
1 221 
1 356 
878 
1 571 
987 
571 
2 597 
1 855 
1 096 
570 
685 
374 
404 
730 
499 
180 
393 
227 
633 
448 
287 
282 
405 
457 
336 
365 
244 
207 
31 2 
223 
464 
31 2 
51 1 
339 
184 
37  264 
61 8 548 
444  744 
21 8 701 
166  156 
161  416 
104  428 
129  509 
99  363 
70  657 
95  425 
64  527 
151 305 
108  905 
99  612 
64  020 
66  198 
51  463 
51  547 
48  91 6 
28  366 
10 595 
20  677 
17  256 
25  831 
33  164 
18  633 
26  576 
19  920 
24  567 
20  042 
31 071 
13 100 
11 817 
32  488 
13  856 
17  028 
11 910 
18  405 
12 634 
11 509 
3 234  885 
71.9 
74.7 
73.3 
81.9 
79.4 
72.9 
75.0 
80.1 
62.0 
79.9 
79.4 
61.3 
56.7 
77.2 
83.9 
76.3 
78.7 
74.3 
61.4 
75.9 
77.9 
75.3 
69.5 
68.8 
58.9 
64.4 
78.2 
66.4 
62.3 
58.1 
72.4 
75.3 
80.2 
88.0 
87.1 
61.3 
55.0 
72.1 
34.3 
84.3 
71.7 
84 
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TABLE 11.1 (Cont.)  SERVICE  FREQUENCY OM TOP 40 ROUTESa  SERVED  BY  DOMESTIC 
AIRLINES,  MARCH  QUARTER 1990 TO  JUNE  QUARTER 1991 
December  quarter 1990 
Average 
Trips  Passengers load factor 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Melbourne-Perth 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Perth-Sydney 
Canberra-Sydney 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Alice  Springs-Darwin 
Brisbane-Rockhampton 
Karratha-Perth 
Hobart-Sydney 
Devonport-Melbourne 
Hamilton  Island-Sydney 
Coffs  Harbour-Sydney 
Cairns-Townsville 
Brisbane-Hamilton  Island 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Darwin-Kununurra 
Perth-Port Hedland 
Cairns-Sydney 
Devonport-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Ayers Rock 
Geraldton-Perth 
Sydney-Wagga 
Mackay-Rockharnpton 
Broorne-Perth 
Total  December  quarter 1990 
5 988 
3 991 
2 398 
2 247 
1 665 
1 390 
1 477 
1 159 
1 684 
1119 
775 
2 531 
1 907 
1 092 
679 
737 
392 
433 
837 
493 
337 
377 
277 
662 
247 
322 
280 
388 
464 
313 
345 
200 
254 
314 
199 
864 
265 
507 
385 
111 
40  105 
690  323 
454 351 
233  536 
l96  127 
159  020 
120  061 
141  240 
138  370 
81  045 
90  253 
81  976 
141 902 
114  134 
82  400 
67  487 
70  388 
48  272 
40  257 
51  378 
27  977 
20 514 
22  908 
25 173 
28  007 
15  092 
22  217 
19  594 
19  318 
25  574 
19  606 
24  891 
9 887 
12  958 
29  251 
11 825 
21 698 
11 532 
17  959 
13 327 
6 890 
3 408  718 
71 .l 
73.4 
70.1 
80.8 
78.6 
75.5 
73.7 
78.6 
69.0 
72.2 
74.2 
57.4 
57.5 
68.0 
80.3 
76.0 
72.9 
56.7 
64.8 
78.5 
74.9 
77.1 
71 .l 
69.8 
54.2 
71.9 
60.9 
68.6 
62.2 
65.6 
64.4 
65.9 
71 .O 
78.6 
73.4 
58.9 
62.4 
70.6 
37.6 
83.3 
69.3 
85 
BTCE Report 73 
TABLE 11.1 (Cont.)  SERVICE  FREQUENCY ON TOP 40 ROUTESa SERVED  BY  DOMESTIC 
AIRLINES,  MARCH  QUARTER 1990 TO JUNE QUARTER 1991 
March  quatfer 199 l 
Average 
Trips  Passengers load factor 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Melbourne-Perth 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Perth-Sydney 
Canberra-Sydney 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Alice  Springs-Darwin 
Brisbane-Rockhampton 
Karratha-Perth 
Hobart-Sydney 
Devonport-Melbourne 
Hamilton  Island-Sydney 
Coffs  Harbour-Sydney 
Cairns-Townsville 
Brisbane-Hamilton  Island 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Darwin-Kununurra 
Perth-Port  Hedland 
Cairns-Sydney 
Devonport-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Geraldton-Perth 
Sydney-Wagga 
Mackay-Rockhampton 
Broome-Perth 
Total  March  quarter 1991 
5 805 
4 048 
2 147 
2 303 
1 548 
1 656 
1 378 
1 379 
1 617 
1 094 
894 
2 175 
1 595 
1 072 
760 
644 
379 
41 8 
609 
428 
426 
366 
300 
600 
208 
235 
240 
321 
41 4 
330 
353 
189 
21 6 
315 
181 
619 
21 0 
51 7 
301 
92 
38  382 
687  776 
452  873 
21 5 239 
193  552 
143  884 
134  058 
130  865 
145 585 
96  430 
90  249 
91  884 
126  120 
106  412 
78  653 
70  940 
58  761 
47 01 5 
36  146 
32  294 
23  690 
24  552 
23  81 0 
21  071 
25  311 
1 1  885 
14  794 
16  438 
15 324 
21  374 
19  727 
24  749 
9 274 
10 805 
26  443 
10  272 
21 806 
10  130 
17  101 
9 805 
5 197 
3 302  294 
69.9 
71.8 
74.5 
73.6 
76.7 
71.8 
75.7 
71 .l 
74.5 
74.5 
62.8 
59.5 
63.3 
66.9 
76.2 
74.2 
74.0 
53.0 
62.4 
77.3 
67.5 
79.2 
58.8 
67.8 
52.4 
64.6 
59.7 
66.1 
58.6 
67.2 
62.9 
66.3 
69.4 
69.4 
69.5 
63 .O 
70.1 
66.3 
37.8 
77.8 
67.4 
86 
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TABLE 11.1 (Cont.)  SERVICE  FREQUENCY ON TOP 40 ROUTESa  SERVED  BY  DOMESTIC 
AIRLINES,  MARCH  QUARTER 1990 TO JUNE  QUARTER 1991 
June quarter 1991 
Average 
Trips Passengers load factor 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Melbourne-Perth 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Perth-Sydney 
Canberra-Sydney 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Alice  Springs-Damin 
Brisbane-Rockharnpton 
Karratha-Perth 
Hobart-Sydney 
Devonport-Melbourne 
Hamilton  Island-Sydney 
Coffs  Harbour-Sydney 
Cairns-Townsville 
Brisbane-Hamilton  Island 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Darwin-Kununurra 
Perth-Port Hedland 
Cairns-Sydney 
Devonport-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Geraldton-Perth 
Sydney-Wagga 
Mackay-Rockharnpton 
Broome-Perth 
Total  June  quarter 1991 
6 468 
4 440 
2 339 
2 234 
1 784 
1 550 
1 422 
l 355 
1 440 
1 477 
945 
2 624 
l 751 
1 092 
71 9 
657 
377 
422 
73 1 
485 
214 
359 
269 
560 
161 
223 
251 
339 
378 
309 
378 
190 
21 6 
394 
182 
370 
214 
526 
370 
174 
40  389 
729  284 
508  135 
223  192 
154  892 
165  834 
119  830 
127  222 
132  778 
76  976 
132 640 
97  308 
143  324 
113  820 
77 1 6 4  
56  050 
53  430 
43 341 
40  902 
44 327 
27  896 
10  610 
19  154 
20  446 
22  256 
8 773 
13  496 
21 469 
16  336 
19  772 
15  271 
30 245 
10 031 
10  861 
43 31 3 
11 354 
21 127 
9 484 
19  070 
12  690 
10 113 
3 414  216 
66.4 
68.6 
75.9 
66.2 
73.5 
70.0 
74.9 
66.7 
70.1 
71 .O 
62.9 
57.9 
61.5 
66.7 
68.7 
66.0 
76.7 
67.2 
70.6 
81 .l 
57.6 
65.9 
67.3 
63.7 
51.9 
65.9 
72.7 
65.9 
60.9 
56.3 
73.6 
71.4 
70.7 
79.2 
70.0 
59.8 
61.3 
77.4 
38.8 
80.1 
67.3 
a. Based on traffic on board during January 1990. 
~~ ~ ~ 
Source DoTC aviation statistics database. 
87 
BTCE Report 73 
TABLE 11.2 AVERAGE  AIRCRAFT  SEATING  CAPACITY ON TOP 
40  ROUTESa  SERVED  BY  DOMESTIC  AIRLINES, 
JUNE  QUARTERS  1990  AND  1991 
Average aircraft size 
June quarter 1990 June quarter 799 l 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Coolangatta-Sydney 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Melbourne-Perth 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Perth-Sydney 
Canberra-Sydney 
Canberra-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Melbourne-Coolangatta 
Adelaide-Perth 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Alice  Springs-Darwin 
Brisbane-Rockhampton 
Karratha-Perth 
Hobart-Sydney 
Devonport-Melbourne 
Hamilton  Island-Sydney 
Coffs  Harbour-Sydney 
Cairns-Townsville 
Brisbane-Hamilton  Island 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Kalgoorlie-Perth 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Darwin-Kununurra 
Perth-Port  Hedland 
Cairns-Sydney 
Devonport-Sydney 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Geraldton-Perth 
Sydney-Wagga 
Mackay-Rockharnpton 
Broorne-Perth 
1 64 
155 
132 
105 
131 
116 
130 
143 
76 
113 
1 73 
94 
109 
126 
138 
130 
134 
134 
101 
73 
81 
71 
106 
58 
142 
98 
120 
73 
89 
89 
113 
75 
72 
112 
70 
62 
72 
50 
89 
72 
170 
167 
126 
105 
126 
110 
120 
147 
76 
127 
1 64 
94 
106 
106 
114 
123 
150 
144 
86 
71 
86 
81 
113 
62 
105 
92 
118 
73 
86 
88 
109 
74 
71 
139 
89 
95 
72 
47 
88 
73 
Average 124 126 
a. Based on traffic on board during January 1990. 
Source DoTC aviation statistics database. 
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TABLE 11.3 WEEKLY  SERVICE  FREQUENCY ON MAIN  ROUTES  SERVED  BY  DOMESTIC 
AIRLINES,  MID  1990  AND  MID  1991 
Route 
Adelaide-Alice  Springs 
Adelaide-Ayers  Rock 
Adelaide-  Brisbane 
Adelaide-Cairns 
Adelaide-Canberra 
Adelaide-Datwin 
Adelaide-Gold  Coast 
Adelaide-Hobart 
Adelaide-Launceston 
Adelaide-Melbourne 
Adelaide-Perth 
Adelaide-Sydney 
Adelaide-Townsville 
Alice  Springs-Ayers  Rock 
Alice  Springs-Brisbane 
Alice  Springs-Cairns 
Alice  Springs-Darwin 
Alice  Springs-Melbourne 
Alice  Springs-Perth 
Alice  Springs-Sydney 
Ayers  Rock-Adelaide 
Ayers  Rock-Brisbane 
Ayers  Rock-Cairns 
Ayers  Rock-Canberra 
Ayers  Rock-  Melbourne 
Ayers  Rock-Perth 
Ayers  Rock-Sydney 
Brisbane-Cairns 
Brisbane-Canberra 
Brisbane-Darwin 
Brisbane-Hobart 
Brisbane-Launceston 
Brisbane-Mackay 
Brisbane-Melbourne 
Brisbane-Mount  Isa 
Brisbane-Perth 
Brisbane-Proserpine 
Brisbane-Rockhampton 
Brisbane-Sydney 
Brisbane-Townsville 
Cairns-Darwin 
Cairns-  Melbourne 
Cairns-Mount  Isa 
Cairns-Perth 
Cairns-Sydney 
Canberra  -Darwin 
Mid 
1990 
30 
30 
163 
70 
164 
28 
107 
97 
82 
169 
51 
185 
27 
57 
33 
27 
38 
49 
19 
45 
30 
11 
19 
10 
33 
15 
26 
115 
1  73 
44 
116 
91 
78 
327 
8 
115 
21 
100 
318 
89 
25 
124 
8 
63 
126 
27 
~ 
Mid Percentage 
1991  change 
29 
30 
21  2 
107 
189 
53 
125 
109 
97 
21  5 
51 
238 
68 
36 
51 
34 
28 
68 
28 
63 
30 
31 
24 
31 
35 
17 
30 
164 
161 
57 
119 
105 
76 
338 
24 
188 
17 
95 
351 
84 
37 
180 
0 
90 
179 
50 
-3 
0 
30 
53 
15 
89 
17 
12 
18 
27 
0 
29 
152 
-37 
55 
26 
-26 
13 
47 
40 
0 
182 
26 
21 0 
6 
13 
15 
43 
-7 
30 
3 
15 
-3 
3 
200 
63 
-1 9 
-5 
10 
-6 
48 
45 
-1 00 
43 
42 
85 
89 
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TABLE 11.3 (Cont.)  WEEKLY  SERVICE  FREQUENCY  ON  MAIN  ROUTES  SERVED  BY 
DOMESTIC  AIRLINES,  MID  1990  AND  MID  1991 
Route 
Mid  Mid  Percentage 
1990 1991 change 
Canberra-Gold  Coast 
Canberra-Hobart 
Canberra-Launceston 
Canberra  -Melbourne 
Canberra-Perth 
Canberra-Sydney 
Darwin-Hobart 
Darwin-Melbourne 
Darwin-Perth 
Darwin-Sydney 
Gold  Coast-Hobart 
Gold  Coast-Launceston 
Gold  Coast  -Melbourne 
Gold  Coast-Perth 
Gold  Coast-Sydney 
Hobart-Launceston 
Hobart-Melbourne 
Hobart-Perth 
Hobart-Sydney 
Launceston-Melbourne 
Launceston-Perth 
Launceston-Sydney 
Mackay  -Melbourne 
Mackay-Rockhampton 
Mackay-Sydney 
Melbourne-Perth 
Melbourne-Proserpine 
Melbourne-Rockharnpton 
Melbourne-Sydney 
Melbourne-Townsville 
Mount  Isa-Townsville 
Perth-Sydney 
Perth-Townsville 
Proserpine-Sydney 
Rockhampton-Sydney 
Sydney-Townsville 
68 
158 
72 
161 
7 
105 
72 
130 
97 
72 
98 
70 
45 
69 
106 
21 
81 
471 
85 
10 
133 
48 
21 
82 
90 
145 
111 
107 
148 
171 
288 
19 
90 
37 
80 
106 
77 
177 
107 
180 
1 
132 
87 
139 
115 
83 
117 
31 
43 
31 
161 
21 
89 
536 
85 
32 
191 
75 
16 
88 
86 
24 
12 
16 
-1 3 
49 
13 
27 
36 
3 
29 
18 
13 
12 
49 
12 
-86 
26 
21 
7 
19 
15 
19 
-56 
-4 
-55 
52 
0 
10 
14 
0 
220 
44 
56 
-24 
7 
-4 
Total 7  072 8 346 18 
Source Domestic airlines’ published schedules. 
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APPENDIX 111 WELFARE CHANGES 
Economic welfare is generally defined as the sum of producer surplus and 
consumer surplus. Producer surplus is equivalent to economic profit, while 
consumer surplus is the area under the demand curve above price. The evidence 
isconvincing that deregulation has brought about lower prices and reduced costs. 
With reference to figure 111.1, assume that prior to deregulation prices were at P1 
while costs were at C1 (to simplify the diiagram  we assume marginal costs equal 
average costs, although the argument in no way hinges on this simplification). 
Producer surplus is then area b, while consumer surplus is area a. Now suppose 
that deregulation causes both costs and prices to fall to a level P2 = C2. Producer 
surplus will fall to zero; however consumer surplus is  the areas a, b,  c, d, e, f. 
There is a net gain in economic welfare of areas c, d,  e, f. 
Quantity 
Figure 111.1 Welfare changes resulting from deregulation 
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